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VOTING, SPENDING, AND THE RIGHT TO 
PARTICIPATE 
Robert Yablon 
ABSTRACT—While the law governing the electoral process has changed 
dramatically in the past decade, one thing has stayed the same: Courts and 
commentators continue to view voting in elections and spending on 
elections through distinct constitutional lenses. On the spending side, First 
Amendment principles guide judicial analysis, and recent decisions have 
been strongly deregulatory. On the voting side, courts rely on a makeshift 
equal protection-oriented framework, and they have tended to be more 
accepting of regulation. Key voting and spending precedents seldom cite 
each other. Similarly, election law scholars typically address voting and 
spending in isolation. 
This Article challenges the prevailing, bifurcated approach to voting 
and spending law. It maintains that the law’s disparate handling of voting 
and spending is unjustified. Voting and spending are, at bottom, two 
methods of participating in the electoral process. Conceiving them as two 
aspects of a broader right to participate—a right the Supreme Court 
recently articulated, but did not develop, in McCutcheon v. FEC—offers a 
principled basis to harmonize voting and spending law and reorient election 
law discourse.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Voting in elections and spending money on elections are two key 
ways to have a say in who governs. Yet we rarely consider these activities 
side by side. Jurisprudentially, they have long been worlds apart. Courts 
analyze constitutional challenges to voting regulations using a makeshift 
framework built on an equal protection-oriented foundation.1 In campaign 
finance cases, courts turn to a separate body of First Amendment 
precedents.2 For the most part, voting and spending cases do not even cite 
one another. Much election law commentary is similarly bifurcated. 
This Article challenges that prevailing approach. Its central thesis is 
that the law’s treatment of voting and spending has diverged in ways that 
cannot be explained by differences in the nature of the two activities. While 
their conceptual dissimilarities are real, voting and spending are, at bottom, 
both methods of participating in and exerting influence on the electoral 
process. Linking them together as two aspects of a broader right to 
participate in elections offers a principled basis to harmonize voting and 
spending law and may point the way toward some broader reorienting of 
election law discourse. 
1 See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189–91 (2008) (plurality opinion). 
2 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339–40 (2010). 
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Now is an especially opportune time for this sort of comparison and 
synthesis. The past decade has been a dramatic one for election law, and as 
the composition of the Supreme Court changes, further upheaval could lay 
ahead. It is thus crucial to take stock of what has occurred and to think 
about potential course corrections and paths forward. 
On the voting front, frenetic legislative and regulatory activity, 
primarily at the state level, has generated substantial litigation but little 
doctrinal clarity. While some states have made it easier for individuals to 
register and to cast ballots,3 many others have moved in the opposite 
direction, passing laws that make the voting process more burdensome for 
at least some prospective voters.4 Voter identification requirements are 
perhaps the most prominent of these measures,5 but states have created 
other voting hurdles as well.6 Much of this state legislative activity came in 
the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Crawford v. Marion 
County Election Board,7 which left the door open to fairly strict voter ID 
mandates. The legality of specific voter ID rules and other participation-
hindering enactments remains hotly contested. Litigation flared up across 
the country during the both the 2014 and 2016 election cycles, resulting in 
a hodgepodge of federal appellate court rulings.8 It is likely only a matter of 
time before the Supreme Court again feels compelled to weigh in. 
3 Within the past two years, for instance, six states have provided for automatic voter registration of 
all driver’s license applicants. See Niraj Chokshi, Automatic Voter Registration a ‘Success’ in Oregon, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/02/us/politics/oregon-voter-
registration.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/C2L3-DZHB]. Many more states have begun providing for 
online registration and others for the preregistration of voters before they turn eighteen. See BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUSTICE, STATES THAT EXPANDED VOTING SINCE THE 2012 ELECTION (2016), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legal-work/Expansive_Appendix_Post-2012.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LW7G-LHZF]. 
4 A Brennan Center survey tallied twenty states in which new voting restrictions have been put in 
place since the 2010 midterm election, including fourteen states with additional restrictions that went in 
effect for the first time in 2016. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, NEW VOTING RESTRICTIONS IN 
AMERICA (2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/New_Voting_
Restrictions.pdf [https://perma.cc/P26S-RKHU]. 
5 See, e.g., Wendy Underhill, Voter Identification Requirements: Voter ID Laws, NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/voter-id.aspx [https://perma.cc/3BVV-3R3X] (cataloging state voter ID laws). 
6 States have, among other changes, imposed new voter registration restrictions and limited 
absentee and early voting. See, e.g., Justin Levitt, Election Deform: The Pursuit of Unwarranted 
Electoral Regulation, 11 ELECTION L.J. 97 (2012); BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 4. 
7 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (plurality opinion). The Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v. 
Holder also played an important facilitating role. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). By invalidating the coverage 
formula of the Voting Rights Act, it freed previously covered states (mostly in the South) to revise their 
voting laws without first obtaining federal preclearance. Id. at 2631. 
8 In both cycles, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, and Wisconsin were among the states that saw the 
most contentious litigation. See, e.g., N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204 
(4th Cir. 2016) (holding that several North Carolina voting restrictions unconstitutionally discriminated 
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Meanwhile, campaign finance law has changed even more 
dramatically, principally in ways that make it easier for individuals and 
organizations to spend money to advance their electoral objectives.9 The 
Supreme Court’s watershed decision in Citizens United v. FEC10 has cast a 
long shadow. Citizens United not only rejected restrictions on corporate 
electoral expenditures, which was itself a significant development; it also 
charted an antiregulatory course by applying reasoning that cast doubt upon 
the constitutionality of other campaign finance measures.11 On the heels of 
Citizens United, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional an Arizona public 
financing scheme that gave participating candidates matching funds to help 
keep pace with big-spending privately funded opponents.12 Then, in 
McCutcheon v. FEC,13 the Court invalidated a federal law that capped the 
total amount of money that a donor may contribute to federal candidates 
during an election cycle.14 Additional legal challenges to campaign finance 
regulations are in the pipeline.15 
The Supreme Court’s McCutcheon decision is especially notable 
because it tentatively gestures toward the sort of integrated approach that 
this Article develops. For the most part, McCutcheon keeps campaign 
finance law in its own doctrinal silo. Chief Justice Roberts’s controlling 
based on race); Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 837 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2016) (rejecting in 
substantial part challenges to Ohio rules governing absentee and provisional balloting); Ohio 
Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 2016) (rejecting a challenge to limitations on early 
voting in Ohio); Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that Texas’s voter ID law 
contravened the Voting Rights Act); Frank v. Walker, 819 F.3d 384 (7th Cir. 2016) (authorizing the 
district court to consider as-applied challenges to Wisconsin’s voter ID law); League of Women Voters 
of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2014) (preliminarily enjoining North Carolina laws 
eliminating same-day registration and prohibiting the counting of certain ballots, but declining to enjoin 
other regulations); Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(preliminarily enjoining limitations on early in-person voting in Ohio), vacated by No. 14-3877, 
2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014); Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014) (upholding 
Wisconsin’s voter ID law). 
9 This Article uses the term “spending” as shorthand to describe both campaign contributions and 
independent election-related expenditures. Doctrinally, the Supreme Court has long analyzed the two 
somewhat differently, and this Article addresses them separately where necessary. 
10 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
11 See discussion infra Sections I.B–E.  
12 Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721 (2011). 
13 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (plurality opinion). 
14 Federal law continues to limit how much a donor can give to an individual candidate. But, after 
McCutcheon, donors are permitted to make the maximum individual contribution to as many federal 
candidates as they would like. 
15 For instance, a three-judge district court recently rejected a constitutional challenge to federal 
restrictions on political party fundraising, and the plaintiffs are seeking review in the Supreme Court, 
which has mandatory appellate jurisdiction over the case. See Republican Party of La. v. FEC, No. 15-
cv-1241, 2016 WL 6601420 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2016), statement as to jurisdiction filed, No. 16-865 (Jan.
6, 2017).
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opinion reviews the challenged law using First Amendment principles 
drawn from prior campaign finance cases, including Citizens United.16 But 
the opinion begins by framing the legal issue more expansively. Its opening 
paragraph declares: 
There is no right more basic in our democracy than the right to participate in 
electing our political leaders. Citizens can exercise that right in a variety of 
ways: They can run for office themselves, vote, urge others to vote for a 
particular candidate, volunteer to work on a campaign, and contribute to a 
candidate’s campaign.17  
By recognizing that various election-related activities share a common 
participatory nucleus, this language suggests the Court’s potential 
receptivity to linking voting and spending jurisprudence more closely. 
While other aspects of McCutcheon have attracted scholarly 
attention,18 the Court’s reference to “the right to participate” has thus far 
largely escaped notice. To the extent commentators have noted 
McCutcheon’s opening rhetoric, they have tended to see it as more of a 
threat to the sanctity of voting than an opportunity to reconcile disparate 
doctrines. They express concern that, “by placing the activities of voting 
and contributing in a common matrix of participation, the Court has 
demoted the right to vote from its usual position as the most fundamental 
democratic right” and “elevat[ed] the right to contribute as normatively 
equivalent to the right to vote.”19 That reaction is understandable, and it 
16 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450 (plurality opinion) (describing the challenged aggregate 
contribution limit as having “significant First Amendment costs”).  
17 Id. at 1440–41 (emphasis added). The Chief Justice wrote for himself and Justices Scalia, 
Kennedy, and Alito. Concurring in the judgment, Justice Thomas expressed no disagreement with the 
Chief Justice’s invocation of “the right to participate.” Id. at 1464 (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (agreeing with the plurality that aggregate contribution limits “impose a special burden on 
broader participation in the democratic process” (quoting id. at 1449 (plurality opinion))). Justice 
Thomas, however, would have abandoned the longstanding distinction between campaign contributions 
and independent expenditures and applied the more stringent independent-expenditure standard to 
invalidate the challenged law. See id. at 1462–64. 
18 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Of Constituents and Contributors, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 29, 70 
(critiquing the Court’s apparent position “that responsiveness to donors serves, rather than distorts, the 
democratic representation elections are supposed to promote”); Josh Chafetz, Governing and Deciding 
Who Governs, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 73, 75 (critiquing the McCutcheon plurality’s “premise that the 
Court stands outside of, and indeed above, the structures and processes of governance”); Joseph Fishkin 
& Heather K. Gerken, The Party’s Over: McCutcheon, Shadow Parties, and the Future of the Party 
System, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 175 (assessing the prospect that McCutcheon will shift the balance of 
power between political parties and outside groups). 
19  DAVID H. GANS, CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY CTR., ROBERTS AT 10: CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE AND VOTING RIGHTS: EASIER TO DONATE, HARDER TO VOTE, 
http://theusconstitution.org/sites/default/files/briefs/Roberts-at-10-Easier-to-Donate-Harder-to-Vote.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PB2H-6LDM]; Yasmin Dawood, Democracy Divided: Campaign Finance Regulation 
and the Right to Vote, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 17, 17 (2014); see also Joseph Fishkin & Heather K. 
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may help to explain why no one has yet accepted the Court’s apparent 
invitation to consider how the right to participate might be conceptualized 
and implemented.20 
Unease about the McCutcheon plurality’s endgame, however, is no 
reason to write off the right to participate. There is nothing inherently 
pernicious about the prospect of a more unified jurisprudential approach to 
voting and spending. To the contrary, it is an idea that proponents of 
stringent campaign finance regulation have themselves sometimes 
embraced. In particular, they have suggested that the equality values that 
animate voting law should apply in the spending context as well.21 More 
broadly, leading election law scholars have long called for “organizing 
principle[s]” that transcend election law’s usual doctrinal categories.22 The 
right to participate may fit the bill. That the Supreme Court has recently 
Gerken, The Two Trends That Matter for Party Politics, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 32, 44 (2014); 
Sherrilyn Ifill, Ifill: Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Ruling Cheapens Voting, HOUS. CHRON. (Apr. 
14, 2014, 4:59 PM), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/opinion/outlook/article/Ifill-Supreme-Court-s-
campaign-finance-ruling-5392991.php [https://perma.cc/RSY9-N5TV]. As far as I am aware, the only 
scholar to describe McCutcheon’s opening language as a potentially promising development is Kate 
Andrias. In a thoughtful, short piece, she suggests that McCutcheon “may hint at a possible path for a 
new reform agenda,” and she encourages “[t]hose who worry about the corrupting influence of money 
and about the problem of political inequality . . . to think seriously about the Court’s gesture toward 
political association.” Kate Andrias, Hollowed-Out Democracy, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 48, 51 
(2014). 
20 Election law scholars have occasionally addressed the concept of participation in other ways. An 
especially notable recent contribution is Spencer Overton, The Participation Interest, 100 GEO. L.J. 
1259 (2012). Focusing on campaign finance, Overton urges courts and legislators to recognize the value 
of encouraging broader public participation in the financing of elections. 
21 See, e.g., David Cole, First Amendment Antitrust: The End of Laissez-Faire in Campaign 
Finance, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 236, 244 (1991) (“When unequal monetary resources translate into 
unequal influence in electoral campaigns, the democratic function of the ‘one person, one vote’ 
guarantee is undermined.”); Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of 
Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1213 (1994) (“[E]qual-dollars-per-voter, like one-
person-one-vote, is an essential precondition of a democratic legislative process.”); David A. Strauss, 
Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1382 (1994) (“The 
counter-slogan to the Buckley v. Valeo dictum about equality—‘the concept that government may 
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is 
wholly foreign to the First Amendment’—is, of course, ‘one person, one vote.’ That principle of 
equality, reformers say, should extend from actual voting to campaign finance.” (quoting Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48−49 (1976) (per curiam))); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of 
Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 671–72 (1997) (“Reformers often proceed from the premise of 
equal suffrage in elections to the conclusion that equalization of speaking power in electoral campaigns 
is similarly justifiable in furtherance of democracy. . . . The principle here would be one person, one 
vote, one dollar.”); J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an 
Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 610 (1982) (“Financial inequalities pose a 
pervasive and growing threat to the principle of ‘one person, one vote,’ and undermine the political 
proposition to which this nation is dedicated—that all men are created equal.”). 
22 Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Foreword: The Constitutionalization of 
Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29, 39 (2004). 
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invoked this right as part of a controversial shift in campaign finance 
doctrine is all the more reason to think carefully about whether and how the 
right should be used. 
Taking McCutcheon as its point of departure, this Article begins in 
Part I with a detailed comparison of the analytic moves that the Supreme 
Court has made in its recent voting and spending cases. This Part identifies 
previously overlooked dissonance between the law of voting and the law of 
spending. Some of the disparities are quite striking. On the voting side, the 
Court has downplayed the burdens that regulations impose, cast the 
government’s regulatory interests in broad terms, and placed the onus 
squarely on plaintiffs to establish that a regulation’s burdens outweigh its 
benefits. On the spending side, the Court has done almost precisely the 
opposite.  
Part II explores whether there is a good reason for the starkly different 
positions that the Court has taken in its voting and spending cases. The 
Court itself has not articulated one; it is not apparent that it has even 
grasped the extent of the disparities.23 Commentators likewise have devoted 
little attention to the issue. The question, however, is significant. If the 
Court’s decisions are out of sync, then that underscores the need to develop 
a more unified account of voting and spending. On the other hand, if the 
seemingly divergent analyses in voting and spending cases have a 
principled basis, then changing course with respect to one or both sets of 
decisions—something commentators frequently call for—might result in 
unintended discordance. Ultimately, Part II concludes that the existing 
incongruities in voting and spending law cannot be persuasively justified 
on either doctrinal or theoretical grounds. 
Part III begins the task of reconciliation. It discusses the constitutional 
basis for treating voting and spending as two manifestations of a right to 
participate, considers the general scope of the right, and takes a first cut at 
operationalizing the right in an effort to unify voting and spending law. 
Although the Constitution does not explicitly refer to it, the right to 
participate seems to be embedded in the document’s very structure. Indeed, 
given our constitutional commitment to representative government, it is no 
stretch to regard electoral participation as one of the Constitution’s 
structural pillars, alongside federalism and the separation of powers. 
Part IV suggests that, beyond resolving tensions in voting and 
spending doctrine, the right to participate could open new avenues of 
23 Cf. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics: Explanations 
and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 324 n.42 (2007) (“For whatever reasons, the Court has not 
attempted to integrate its campaign finance, gerrymandering, and electoral mechanics cases into a 
unified body of law . . . .”). 
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inquiry in election law jurisprudence and scholarship. First, it encourages 
discussion of who ought to be participating in various aspects of the 
electoral process. The populations of those eligible to vote and to spend are 
somewhat different, but scholars and courts rarely pause to reflect on why 
these lines have been drawn as they have and whether they are the right 
ones. Second, because the right to participate encompasses multiple 
activities, it directs attention to the overall circumstances of participants. 
For instance, perhaps a voting regulation becomes especially suspect if its 
burdens fall principally on individuals who are otherwise at risk of being 
marginalized in the political process. Finally, the right to participate may 
help to bridge a longstanding divide in the election law literature between 
those who emphasize individual rights and those who focus on structural 
values. While the right to participate is individually held, determining its 
proper scope requires judgments about what a properly functioning 
electoral process entails.  
I. THE DISCORDANT JURISPRUDENCE OF VOTING AND SPENDING
By linking voting and contributing as two aspects of a broader right to
participate in the electoral process, McCutcheon invites a comparison of 
how the judiciary handles legal challenges to regulation of those activities. 
While the literature teems with discussions and critiques of the Supreme 
Court’s recent voting and spending decisions,24 it contains little in the way 
of comparative analysis. A few commentators have observed that recent 
decisions seem to show greater solicitude for spenders than for voters.25 But 
those observations are merely a starting point. They do not take the further 
step of detailing how the Court approaches spending and voting 
controversies. Even if spenders might be said to have fared better than 
voters in recent cases, perhaps the Court is nevertheless employing similar 
24 See, e.g., RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME COURT,
AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS (2016); ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2014); Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and 
the Individual Right to Vote, 86 IND. L.J. 1289, 1291 (2011). 
25 See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court, 2011 Term—Foreword: Democracy and 
Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 32 (2012) (“A striking feature of the Roberts Court is that, when it 
comes to the act of voting, the Justices are decidedly less skeptical of government restrictions [than they 
are in the campaign finance context].”); id. at 41 (“The Roberts Court . . . seems more concerned with 
protecting the ability of the powerful to spend money in the political process than with protecting equal 
access to the levers of political power.”); Wendy R. Weiser & Lawrence Norden, Supreme Court: 
Helping Biggest Donors, but What About Voters?, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Apr. 30, 2014), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/supreme-court-helping-biggest-donors-what-about-voters 
[https://perma.cc/X734-SDAE] (“The Supreme Court has made clear that it will judge attempts to 
restrict the monetary kind of ‘participation’ very strictly. By contrast, restrictions on voting . . . have 
been judged far more leniently.”). 
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underlying analytical intuitions and techniques in both areas. Or, as this 
Part suggests, perhaps not.  
A. The Overarching Legal Frameworks
Before exploring some of the specific doctrinal features of recent 
voting and spending decisions, it is worth considering the overarching 
structure of the Supreme Court’s analysis. At a high level of generality, the 
legal frameworks that the Supreme Court uses in voting and spending cases 
are conceptually similar, albeit couched in somewhat different terms. In 
both contexts, the Court’s basic approach is to identify regulatory burdens 
and benefits and weigh them against each other. The Court determines how 
severely a challenged law encumbers the rights of regulated parties, and it 
assesses the validity and importance of the governmental interests that the 
law is said to advance. It then considers whether the law’s purported 
benefits suffice to justify the burdens.26 As burdens mount, the Court insists 
upon weightier countervailing interests and scrutinizes more carefully 
whether the disputed law is indeed necessary to advance those interests.27 
On the voting side, the Court has candidly referred to its inquiry as a 
“balancing approach.”28 As the plurality in Crawford v. Marion County 
Election Board articulated it, laws that severely burden the right to vote are 
permissible only when “narrowly drawn [to advance a] state interest of 
compelling importance.”29 When laws impose lesser burdens, states may 
rely upon correspondingly less compelling interests to validate them, 
though even a “slight” burden “must be justified by relevant and legitimate 
state interests ‘sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation.’”30 The 
Crawford dissenters largely accepted the plurality’s description of the 
26 See, e.g., Fishkin, supra note 24, at 1291 (describing the Court’s “basic doctrinal approach” to 
election law as one that “focus[es] on individual rights and competing state interests”); Nicholas O. 
Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 283, 291, 295 (2014) (identifying the 
Supreme Court’s “dominant election law theory” as one that seeks “the concurrent optimization of 
individual rights and state interests”). 
27 See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992). 
28 Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190 (2008) (plurality opinion) (“[A] court 
evaluating a constitutional challenge to an election regulation [must] weigh the asserted injury to the 
right to vote against the ‘precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden 
imposed by its rule.’” (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434)). While the plurality embraced balancing as 
the norm for reviewing voting laws that are “not invidious,” it suggested, somewhat opaquely, that 
balancing is unnecessary when a law invidiously denies voting opportunities for reasons “irrelevant to 
the voter’s qualifications” (e.g., on the basis of race or wealth). Id. at 189–90. Because such laws serve 
no valid purpose, they are per se invalid. There is nothing to balance in their favor. Cf. Harper v. Va. 
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 664–66 (1966) (invalidating Virginia’s poll tax). 
29 553 U.S. at 190 (plurality opinion).  
30 Id. at 191 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288–89 (1992)). 
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governing legal standard; they simply disagreed with how the plurality 
applied it.31 The approach itself was not novel. The Justices drew heavily 
from prior cases involving laws that restricted the range of options given to 
voters on the ballot—for instance, measures that operated to exclude 
certain candidates or that precluded write-in voting.32 Crawford’s 
innovation was to import the balancing analysis long used in the ballot 
access context into cases involving regulations on the vote-casting process 
itself.33 
On the campaign finance side, the Court has developed a more formal 
taxonomy that purports to subject different types of regulations to different 
tiers of judicial scrutiny, but the analysis still essentially boils down to a 
comparison of regulatory burdens and state interests.34 As the Court has 
explained, the level of scrutiny rises as the “encroach[ment] upon protected 
First Amendment interests” grows.35 Because the Court views restrictions 
on political expenditures as an especially burdensome class of regulations, 
it subjects them to strict or “exacting scrutiny,” which means they cannot 
stand unless they are “the least restrictive means” to further a “compelling” 
governmental interest.36 The Court views a second category of campaign 
31 See id. at 210 (Souter, J., dissenting) (applying “a sliding-scale balancing analysis”); id. at 237 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (balancing “the voting-related interests that the statute affects” and assessing 
whether its burdens are out of proportion to its benefits). Three concurring Justices, in contrast, 
criticized the plurality’s balancing standard as “amorphous” and instead advocated a “two-track 
approach.” Id. at 205 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). In their view, the Court’s task should be 
to “decide whether a challenged law severely burdens the right to vote.” Id. If so, the law was subject to 
strict scrutiny. Id. Otherwise, the Court should defer to the government’s asserted regulatory interests. 
Id. at 204–05, 208. 
32 E.g., Burdick, 504 U.S. at 430 (upholding a Hawaii law prohibiting write-in voting); Norman, 
502 U.S. at 282 (invalidating, in part, Illinois laws governing new political parties’ access to the ballot); 
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 782–83, 806 (1983) (invalidating an Ohio law requiring 
candidates to submit their nominating petitions more than seven months before the election). 
33 Cf. Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 92 n.431 (2008) (observing that, in contrast to the ballot access cases, Crawford 
involved a direct encumbrance on a voter’s core right to cast any ballot at all). 
34 See, e.g., Elmendorf, supra note 23, at 324 (noting that campaign finance is a domain “that ha[s] 
not been assimilated into the Burdick framework” (i.e., the balancing approach used in Crawford)); 
Stephanopoulos, supra note 26, at 337 (“When campaign finance laws are challenged, courts evaluate 
them using a variant of the rights-and-interests balancing on which they rely in several other 
domains.”). 
35 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1444 (2014) (plurality opinion); see also Ariz. Free Enter. 
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 735 (2011) (“[W]e have subjected strictures on 
campaign-related speech that we have found less onerous to a lower level of scrutiny and upheld those 
restrictions.”). 
36 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1444 (plurality opinion); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 
310, 339–40 (2010) (characterizing federal restrictions on corporate independent political expenditures 
as “a ban on speech . . . ‘subject to strict scrutiny’” (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 
449, 464 (2007) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.))); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259–60 
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finance laws—those that cap the amount of a person’s direct contributions 
to candidates—as a somewhat “lesser restraint on political speech.”37 
Accordingly, contribution limits face “a lesser but still ‘rigorous standard 
of review.’”38 They “may be sustained if the State demonstrates a 
sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid 
unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.”39 In McCutcheon, the 
petitioner asked the Court to abandon its longstanding distinction between 
expenditures and contributions and to subject regulations on both to strict 
scrutiny.40 While the Court declined that invitation, the plurality’s opinion 
arguably did blur the line between the applicable levels of scrutiny by 
suggesting that both standards require reviewing courts to “assess the fit 
between the stated governmental objective and the means selected to 
achieve that objective.”41 Meanwhile, the Court has held that laws such as 
disclosure requirements impose lesser First Amendment burdens and thus 
are allowable as long as they bear a “substantial relation” to a “‘sufficiently 
important’ governmental interest.”42 Taken together, these varying levels of 
scrutiny amount to a balancing inquiry in the campaign finance context that 
is analogous in structure to the inquiry undertaken in the voting context. 
The Sections that follow delve more deeply into how the Court in 
voting and spending cases proceeds from these comparable starting points. 
Is the Court applying a shared set of sensibilities and reaching similar 
(1986) (“We have consistently held that restrictions on contributions require less compelling 
justification than restrictions on independent spending.”). 
37 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1444 (plurality opinion). 
38 Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1976) (per curiam)). 
39 Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25). 
40 Id. at 1445. The contribution–expenditure distinction originated in Buckley. See Buckley, 
424 U.S. at 44–45. 
41 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1445 (plurality opinion); cf. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. 
v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 638 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part)
(“Whether an individual donates money to a candidate or group who will use it to promote the
candidate or whether the individual spends the money to promote the candidate himself, the individual
seeks to engage in political expression and to associate with like-minded persons. A contribution is
simply an indirect expenditure . . . .”). The Court arguably blurred the lines still further in its most
recent campaign finance ruling, which upheld a Florida rule barring judicial candidates from personally
soliciting campaign contributions. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015). The Court
purported to apply strict scrutiny, but it performed an unusually forgiving narrow-tailoring analysis,
prompting Justice Scalia to object in dissent that the Court had applied only “the appearance of strict
scrutiny.” Id. at 1677 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1678 (“This is not strict scrutiny; it is sleight
of hand.”). Concurring in the Court’s opinion, Justice Breyer expressed the view that “tiers of scrutiny”
are merely “guidelines informing our approach to the case at hand, not tests to be mechanically
applied.” Id. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring).
42 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366–67 (2010) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64, 66). 
Somewhat confusingly, the Court has sometimes referred to this lesser level of scrutiny as “exacting.” 
See, e.g., id. at 366 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64). 
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conclusions, or is it following two separate scripts? How, for instance, does 
the Court analyze the burdens that voting and spending regulations impose 
on affected parties? What does it make of the countervailing interests that 
the government asserts? By examining these particulars and others, the 
remainder of this Part identifies a number of notable—and sometimes 
striking—points of doctrinal divergence. 
B. Regulatory Burdens
In both voting and spending cases, assessing regulatory burdens is a 
prominent element of the judicial inquiry. But those assessments appear to 
have diverged in at least two ways. First, recent voting decisions have 
arguably downplayed the severity of regulatory burdens, while recent 
spending decisions have done the opposite. Second, recent voting decisions 
have tended to focus on a regulation’s aggregate consequences rather than 
its impact on particular individuals; recent spending decisions are the 
reverse. 
1. Severity of Burdens.—Crawford, in which the Supreme Court
made its most extensive effort in recent years to grapple with the right to 
cast a vote, illustrates well the Court’s minimization of regulatory burdens. 
The plurality stressed that Indiana’s voter ID law imposed modest costs on 
the typical voter. Even for individuals without valid identification, the 
plurality’s view was that, by and large, “the inconvenience of making a trip 
to the BMV, gathering the required documents, and posing for a 
photograph surely does not qualify as a substantial burden on the right to 
vote, or even represent a significant increase over the usual burdens of 
voting.”43 The plurality acknowledged that the law might place a “special” 
and “somewhat heavier burden” on “a limited number of persons,” 
including “elderly persons born out of State,” “homeless persons,” and 
others who might have difficulty obtaining their birth certificates.44 But the 
plurality discounted the “severity of that burden” by observing that the law 
provided a safety valve, allowing individuals without identification to cast 
provisional ballots that would be counted if the voter later traveled to the 
local clerk’s office and executed an affidavit.45 
Notably, the plurality and the concurring Justices refrained from 
invoking canonical statements from earlier cases stressing the fundamental 
43 Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 198 (2008) (plurality opinion); see also 
Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 749 (7th Cir. 2014) (applying Crawford and expressing skepticism that 
Wisconsin’s voter ID law “is an obstacle to a significant number of persons who otherwise would cast 
ballots”). 
44 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 199 (plurality opinion). 
45 Id. 
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nature of the right to vote and decrying burdens on its exercise. They made 
no mention, for instance, of the Court’s declaration in Reynolds v. Sims that 
“any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully 
and meticulously scrutinized” since “the right to exercise the franchise in a 
free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political 
rights.”46 And the plurality discounted the relevance of Harper v. Virginia 
State Board of Elections,47 which had invalidated Virginia’s $1.50 poll tax 
on the ground that “the right to vote is too precious, too fundamental to be 
so burdened or conditioned.”48 The Crawford plurality did not suggest that 
Indiana’s voter ID law was, practically speaking, less burdensome than 
Virginia’s poll tax. Instead, it reasoned that the laws differed in kind: 
Virginia’s tax “invidiously discriminate[d]” based on wealth—a 
characteristic “unrelated to voter qualifications.”49 Indiana’s law, in 
contrast, was at least arguably directed at “protect[ing] the integrity and 
reliability of the electoral process,” which made its burdens potentially 
more tolerable.50 
In recent campaign finance cases, the Court’s depiction of burdens has 
been strikingly different. The Court has not hesitated to characterize a 
regulation’s burdens as severe. In McCutcheon, for instance, the plurality 
maintained that the Federal Election Campaign Act’s annual aggregate 
contribution limit, which left donors free to contribute more than $100,000 
per election cycle to candidates and political committees before hitting the 
cap, “seriously restrict[ed] participation in the democratic process.”51 Along 
similar lines, the Court in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club 
PAC v. Bennett concluded that Arizona “substantially burden[ed] protected 
political speech” by providing public matching funds to candidates whose 
46 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964); see also id. at 555 (“The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s 
choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of 
representative government.”); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965) (“‘The right . . . to choose’ 
that this Court has been so zealous to protect, means, at the least, that States may not casually deprive a 
class of individuals of the vote because of some remote administrative benefit to the State.” (quoting 
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 314 (1941))); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) 
(describing voting as “a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights”).  
47 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
48 Id. at 670. 
49 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 189 (plurality opinion) (quoting Harper, 383 U.S. at 666). 
50 Id. at 189–90 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983)). 
51 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014) (plurality opinion). This has not always been 
the Court’s approach. In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 396 (2000), the 
Court noted that the overwhelming majority of donors—nearly 98%—made contributions of less than 
the maximum amount allowed by the challenged state contribution limits, and it explained that, even 
assuming that the cap affected the “ability [of the candidate who was challenging the limits] to wage a 
competitive campaign . . . a showing of one affected individual does not point up a system of 
suppressed political advocacy that would be unconstitutional under Buckley.” 
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privately financed opponents and their supporters exceeded certain 
spending thresholds.52 While the matching-funds scheme did not “actually 
prevent anyone from speaking in the first place or cap campaign 
expenditures,”53 and might have even increased the overall level of 
election-related speech, the Court nevertheless viewed it as “an 
unprecedented penalty on any candidate who robustly exercises [his] First 
Amendment right[s].”54 
The Court likewise played up the burdens of the corporate expenditure 
regulations at issue in Citizens United, characterizing them as “an outright 
ban” on speech.55 According to the Court, the fact that the regulations 
applied only during a limited pre-election window, and that corporations 
could still spend money through political action committees (PACs) within 
that window, did not meaningfully diminish their severity.56 The Court 
described PACs as “burdensome alternatives,” which “are expensive to 
administer and subject to extensive regulations” of their own.57 By way of 
contrast, in Crawford, the Court easily could have portrayed the provisional 
ballot option that Indiana offered to voters without valid identification as a 
“burdensome alternative.”58 Yet the Crawford plurality described the option 
as one that “mitigated” the “severity” of the law’s burdens.59 
2. Individual Versus Aggregate Burdens.—Discussions of burdens in
recent voting and spending cases have also differed with respect to the 
52 564 U.S. 721, 728 (2011). 
53 Id. at 733 (quoting McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510, 525 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
54 Id. at 736 (quoting Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 739 (2008)); see also Davis, 554 U.S. at 739 
(discussing the “special and potentially significant burden” imposed on candidates who spent more than 
$350,000 of their own money by a law that relaxed the contribution limits applicable to such 
candidates’ opponents). 
55 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 337 (2010). 
56 Id. at 337–38. 
57 Id. at 337. Compare id. (“Even if a PAC could somehow allow a corporation to speak—and it 
does not—the option to form PACs does not alleviate the First Amendment problems with § 441b.”), 
with McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 204 (2003) (“Because corporations can still fund electioneering 
communications with PAC money, it is ‘simply wrong’ to view the provision as a ‘complete ban’ on 
expression rather than a regulation.” (quoting FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 162 (2003))). The Court 
has also held that “[d]isclaimer and disclosure requirements may burden the ability to speak,” but it has 
viewed those burdens as less severe than the burdens associated with expenditure and contribution 
limits. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366. 
58 The dissenters made this point, calling provisional-ballot rules “onerous”—a “high hurdle” that 
did “not obviate the burdens” of the state’s voter ID requirement. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election 
Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 216–17 (2008) (Souter, J., dissenting); cf. Karlan, supra note 25, at 41 (“[W]e might 
ask why the Justices downplay the burdens poor people face from having to negotiate a bureaucratic 
maze to obtain sufficient identification . . . while being so solicitous of the First Amendment burdens 
placed on wealthy speakers.”). 
59 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 199 (plurality opinion). 
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relevant unit of analysis. In Crawford, the plurality acknowledged the 
“special” burden that Indiana’s voter ID requirement imposed on some 
voters, but stressed that they were “limited [in] number.”60 The plurality’s 
view was that, at least in the context of a facial challenge to Indiana’s law, 
the burden assessment should focus on “the statute’s broad application to 
all Indiana voters.”61 The three Justices who concurred in the judgment 
went further and maintained that the only relevant burden was “the single 
burden that the law uniformly impose[d] on all voters.”62 As they saw it, 
because the law was nondiscriminatory, its “individual impacts” on certain 
“vulnerable voters” were simply not a matter of constitutional concern.63 
In contrast, the Court’s recent campaign finance cases have 
emphasized individual burdens rather than assessing burdens in the 
aggregate. Even though these cases have presented facial challenges, the 
Court has not suggested that burdens must be widespread to be of concern. 
McCutcheon, for instance, contained no mention of how many individuals 
might actually be encumbered by the Federal Election Campaign Act’s 
$100,000-plus annual aggregate contribution limit.64 Presumably the 
number was far smaller than the number of voters encumbered by Indiana’s 
voter ID law. But, according to the McCutcheon plurality, it was 
problematic to require even “one person to contribute at lower levels than 
others because he wants to support more candidates or causes.”65 “It is no 
answer,” the plurality maintained, “to say that the individual can simply 
contribute less money to more people.”66 For that individual, the law 
“impose[d] a special burden on broader participation in the democratic 
process.”67  
C. Governmental Interests
In both voting and spending cases, the Court also considers the 
interests that the government may assert in an effort to justify a law’s 
burdens. And again, the Court’s analysis differs from one context to the 
next. On the voting side, the Court’s recent decisions discuss the 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 202–03. 
62 Id. at 205 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).  
63 Id. at 205, 207; see also id. at 208 (expressing concern that “an individual-focused approach” 
would require “detailed judicial supervision of the election process”). 
64 The aggregate limits at issue in McCutcheon are codified at 52 U.S.C.A. § 30116(a)(3) (West 
2014). See id. § 30116(c) (providing for adjustments based on inflation).  
65 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1449 (2014) (plurality opinion). 
66 Id. 
67 Id.  
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government’s interests in expansive and deferential terms. On the spending 
side, the Court has taken a narrower and more skeptical view.  
In Crawford and elsewhere, the Court has referred to “the State’s 
broad interests in protecting election integrity” and in “protecting public 
confidence in the integrity and legitimacy of representative government.”68 
It has described these interests as “indisputably . . . compelling” and called 
public confidence in the electoral system “essential to the functioning of 
our participatory democracy.”69 These were the interests that the Crawford 
plurality ultimately relied upon as justifications for upholding Indiana’s 
voter ID law.70 In so doing, the plurality made clear that the state was 
entitled to assert and pursue more than just a narrow “interest in deterring 
and detecting voter fraud.”71 
In campaign finance cases, the Court at one time described the 
government’s interests in similar terms. For example, in McConnell v. 
FEC, which upheld most of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
(BCRA), the Court wrote that the government’s regulatory interests were 
“not confined” to rooting out quid pro quo corruption.72 Instead, they 
included minimizing “‘improper influence’ and ‘opportunities for abuse,’” 
“combating the appearance or perception of corruption engendered by large 
campaign contributions,” and preserving “the willingness of voters to take 
part in democratic governance.”73 This characterization of the government’s 
regulatory interests accords with statements the Court made decades earlier 
in upholding the Tillman Act’s restrictions on corporate and union political 
contributions. According to the Court, the Tillman Act aimed “not merely 
to prevent the subversion of the integrity of the electoral process,” but also 
“to sustain the active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a 
democracy for the wise conduct of government.”74 
68 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 197, 200 (plurality opinion) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also id. at 191 (noting “the State’s interest in protecting the integrity and reliability of the 
electoral process”); Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (per curiam). 
69 Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4 (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 
(1989)); see also Crawford, 553 U.S. at 197 (plurality opinion) (explaining that public confidence 
“encourages citizen participation in the democratic process”). 
70 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 191 (plurality opinion). 
71 Id. 
72 540 U.S. 93, 143 (2003). Quid pro quo corruption, the Court has explained, “captures the notion 
of a direct exchange of an official act for money.” McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441 (plurality opinion). 
73 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143–44 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389–90 
(2000)); see also Nixon, 528 U.S. at 389 (“[W]e [have] recognized a concern not confined to bribery of 
public officials, but extending to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of 
large contributors.”). 
74 United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 575 (1957). 
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The Court’s recent campaign finance decisions, in contrast, have 
articulated a much more circumscribed conception of the government’s 
interests, and the sort of sentiments expressed above have been relegated to 
dissents.75 As the McCutcheon plurality put it, the sole interest now 
recognized as a valid rationale for limiting campaign contributions or 
expenditures is “preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.”76 
And the government may target “only a specific type of corruption—‘quid 
pro quo’ corruption.”77 The Court’s current position is that the government 
has no valid interest in seeking to reduce the appearance of special 
influence or access.78 Beyond the anticorruption interest, the only other 
governmental interest that the Court has blessed is an “interest in 
‘provid[ing] the electorate with information’ about the sources of election-
related spending”—an interest that has been held to justify laws that require 
the disclosure of contributions or expenditures.79  
D. Factual Determinations and Regulatory Fit
Once the Court identifies the relevant burdens and interests in voting 
and spending cases, its next task is to determine whether the interests 
advanced justify the burdens imposed. In the voting context, the Court has 
placed the onus on plaintiffs to come forward with specific evidence to 
establish that a regulation’s burdens outweigh its benefits. Meanwhile, it 
has required little from the government before crediting its regulatory 
justifications. In campaign finance cases, the situation is nearly the reverse. 
75 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 470–71 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“When citizens turn on their televisions and radios before an election and hear 
only corporate electioneering, they may lose faith in their capacity, as citizens, to influence public 
policy. . . . The predictable result is cynicism and disenchantment: an increased perception that large 
spenders ‘call the tune’ and a reduced ‘willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance.’” 
(quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 144)). 
76 134 S. Ct. at 1450 (plurality opinion). 
77 Id. In Citizens United, the Court overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 
652 (1990), which had recognized “a compelling governmental interest in preventing ‘the corrosive and 
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate 
form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.’” 
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 348 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660). Citizens United took the position 
that Austin’s broad conception of corruption was at odds with the Court’s prior decision in Buckley. See 
id. at 359 (“When Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing 
corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption.”); see 
also McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450 (plurality opinion) (“No matter how desirable it may seem, it is 
not an acceptable governmental objective to ‘level the playing field,’ or to ‘level electoral 
opportunities,’ or to ‘equaliz[e] the financial resources of candidates.’” (citations omitted)). 
78 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451 (plurality opinion). 
79 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 367 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976) (per curiam)); 
see also McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1459–60 (plurality opinion). 
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The Court has asked little of plaintiffs while viewing the government’s 
attempts to justify its regulations with a skeptical eye. 
In Crawford, the plurality stated that the challengers to Indiana’s voter 
ID law bore “a heavy burden of persuasion” to sustain their “broad” facial 
attack on the law.80 The plurality faulted the challengers for failing to offer 
“concrete evidence” to “quantify” the burden on the voters most directly 
affected by the law and the extent to which that burden was unjustified by 
the state’s interests.81 Dissenting, Justice Souter responded that the Court 
had never before insisted upon “empirical precision . . . for raising a 
voting-rights claim.”82  
At the same time, the Crawford plurality demanded little from the 
state before crediting its justifications for its voter ID law. The plurality 
gave substantial weight to the state’s asserted interest in preventing fraud 
even though “[t]he record contain[ed] no evidence of any [in-person voter 
impersonation] fraud actually occurring in Indiana at any time in its 
history.”83 As for the state’s contention that its law would advance its 
interest in protecting “public confidence in the integrity of the electoral 
process,” the plurality saw no need for empirical substantiation.84 It 
apparently took it as self-evident that instituting safeguards against fraud 
would “inspire public confidence.”85 
Given the fractured nature of the Court’s decision, it is difficult to 
predict just how much more the Justices would have required of the state 
80 Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 200 (2008) (plurality opinion). 
81 Id. at 200–01; see also id. at 201 (“From this limited evidence we do not know the magnitude of 
the impact [the voter ID law] will have on indigent voters in Indiana.”); id. at 202 (“In sum, on the basis 
of the record that has been made in this litigation, we cannot conclude that the statute imposes 
‘excessively burdensome requirements’ on any class of voters.” (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 
724, 738 (1974))). In Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014), perhaps the highest profile 
appellate court application of Crawford, the Seventh Circuit engaged in similar evidentiary scrutiny. It 
noted the absence of trial-level findings “that substantial numbers of persons eligible to vote have tried 
to get a voter ID but been unable to do so” or that photo-ID laws depressed voter turnout. Id. at 746–47. 
82 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 221 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
83 Id. at 194 (plurality opinion). 
84 Id. at 197. Justice Souter, in contrast, contended in dissent that the state should not prevail 
without “a particular, factual showing that threats to its interests outweigh the particular impediments it 
has imposed.” Id. at 209 (Souter, J., dissenting). He criticized the plurality for failing to “insist enough 
on the hard facts that our standard of review demands.” Id. at 211. 
85 Id. at 197 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Seventh Circuit in Frank 
treated Crawford as establishing the public confidence benefits of voter ID laws as a “legislative fact” 
that it was bound to accept as true even if presented with evidence to the contrary. Frank, 768 F.3d at 
750. Dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Posner insisted that “there is no evidence
that [voter ID] laws promote confidence in the electoral system,” and he criticized the panel for
“conjur[ing] up a fact-free cocoon” to avoid reckoning with that evidentiary gap. Frank v. Walker,
773 F.3d 783, 794–95 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
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had the challengers better documented the law’s burdens on particular 
voters. The plurality’s conclusion that the challengers had not adequately 
established the law’s burdens no doubt contributed to its decision not to 
scrutinize the state’s asserted interests more carefully.86 Thus, the plurality 
might have insisted upon additional proof from the state. The three Justices 
who concurred in the judgment, however, likely would have been 
unmoved. In their view, “[i]t is for state legislatures to weigh the costs and 
benefits of possible changes to their election codes, and their judgment 
must prevail unless it imposes a severe and unjustified overall burden upon 
the right to vote, or is intended to disadvantage a particular class.”87 
In contrast, in the campaign finance context, the Court in Citizens 
United entertained a similarly broad facial challenge without requiring the 
plaintiffs to make any heightened evidentiary showings. The Court did not 
insist that the challenger offer any particular empirical substantiation of the 
breadth and severity of the burden imposed by the corporate expenditure 
restriction. It did not, for instance, demand any formal proof concerning the 
inadequacy of PACs as a means for corporations to make lawful election-
related expenditures. It simply dismissed PACs as “burdensome 
alternatives.”88 By way of explanation, the Court maintained that it “must 
give the benefit of any doubt to protecting rather than stifling speech.”89 
The Court in Arizona Free Enterprise asked equally little of the 
challengers to Arizona’s public financing scheme. The state had faulted the 
challengers for “fail[ing] to ‘cite specific instances in which they decided 
not to raise or spend funds’ and . . . ‘fail[ing] to present any reliable 
evidence that Arizona’s triggered matching funds deter[red] their 
speech.’”90 Rejecting those arguments, the Court first pointed to a few 
examples in the record of specific candidates and groups who were said to 
86 See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) (noting that courts must consider the 
“asserted injury to the right[] . . . that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate” before “identify[ing] and 
evaluat[ing] the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its 
rule”). Compare Crawford, 553 U.S. at 225–30 (Souter, J., dissenting) (scrutinizing the state’s asserted 
interests more carefully and concluding that they were too tenuously connected to the voter ID law to 
justify the law’s burdens), with id., 553 U.S. at 208 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (concluding 
that, absent “a severe and unjustified overall burden,” the legislature’s “judgment must prevail”). 
87 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 208 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
88 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 337 (2010). Compare id. (holding that the “option to form 
PACs does not alleviate the First Amendment problems”), with McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 203 
(2003) (“The ability to form and administer separate segregated funds [i.e., PACs] . . . has provided 
corporations and unions with a constitutionally sufficient opportunity to engage in express advocacy.”). 
89 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 327 (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 
(2007) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.)). 
90 564 U.S. 721, 744 (2011) (citations omitted). 
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have changed their behavior in response to the law.91 But the Court then 
declared that, in any event, “we do not need empirical evidence to 
determine that the law at issue is burdensome” because “the burden . . . is 
evident and inherent in the choice that confronts privately financed 
candidates and independent expenditure groups.”92  
Meanwhile, on the other side of the ledger, the Court’s recent 
campaign finance cases have set a high bar for the government. 
McCutcheon and Citizens United are both illustrative. In McCutcheon, the 
government contended that BCRA’s aggregate contribution limits served to 
prevent the limits on contributions to individual candidates from being 
circumvented.93 Deeming the likelihood of circumvention “far too 
speculative,” the plurality concluded that the government had failed to 
carry its burden.94 Additionally, the plurality faulted the law for being 
“poorly tailored” to the government’s asserted interest.95 In the plurality’s 
view, whatever salutary anti-circumvention benefits the aggregate 
contribution limits may have had, they likely thwarted many contributions 
that posed no circumvention concerns.96 The plurality’s animating principle 
was that, “[w]hen the Government restricts speech, the Government bears 
the burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions.”97 By way of 
analogy and contrast, the Crawford plurality did not suggest any tailoring 
problem with Indiana’s voter ID law even though many of the people 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 745–46. 
93 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1452 (2014) (plurality opinion). More specifically, the claim was that, without 
an aggregate limit, a donor who wanted to give a particular candidate more than was allowable would 
be able to contribute to an unlimited number of other candidates or political committees, and they could 
then reroute that money to (or otherwise support) the donor’s preferred candidate.  
94 Id. at 1452–53; see also id. at 1456 (describing the circumvention scenarios offered by the 
government as “divorced from reality”). 
95 Id. at 1456–57 (stating that “[e]ven when the Court is not applying strict scrutiny,” it still 
requires “a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective” (quoting Bd. of Trs. of S.U.N.Y. 
v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989))). 
96 Id. at 1457; see also id. at 1458 (“Based on what we can discern from experience, the
indiscriminate ban on all contributions above the aggregate limits is disproportionate to the 
Government’s interest in preventing circumvention.”). The Court also noted that Congress had 
“multiple alternatives available . . . that would serve the Government’s anticircumvention interest, while 
avoiding ‘unnecessary abridgement’ of First Amendment rights.” Id. at 1458 (quoting Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam)). In Arizona Free Enterprise, the Court wrote that even if the 
state’s law was “more efficient than other alternatives,” the state’s desire “to ‘find[] the sweet spot’ and 
‘fine-tun[e]’ its public funding system to achieve its desired level of participation without an undue 
drain on public resources, is not a sufficient justification for the burden.” 564 U.S. at 747, 753 (quoting 
id. at 779 (Kagan, J., dissenting)). 
97 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452 (plurality opinion) (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t 
Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816 (2000)). 
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encumbered by the law plainly sought to cast legitimate votes, not 
fraudulent ones. 
Similarly, in Citizens United, the Court cast aside several of the 
government’s asserted regulatory rationales essentially by fiat. Rather than 
meaningfully engage with the extensive record that Congress had compiled 
when it enacted BCRA, the Court simply proclaimed that “[t]he appearance 
of influence or access . . . will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our 
democracy” and “that independent expenditures, including those made by 
corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of 
corruption.”98 The Court confirmed the categorical nature of these 
pronouncements two years after Citizens United when it summarily 
reversed a Montana Supreme Court decision upholding Montana’s ban on 
corporate electoral expenditures.99 The Montana Supreme Court had 
reasoned that Citizens United was not controlling because the state had 
adduced Montana-specific evidence “that independent expenditures by 
corporations did in fact lead to corruption or the appearance of corruption 
in Montana.”100 Without engaging with that evidence, the U.S. Supreme 
Court declared that “Montana’s arguments . . . were already rejected in 
Citizens United, or fail to meaningfully distinguish that case.”101 
98 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357, 360 (2010); see also Ariz. Free Enter., 564 U.S. at 
751 (“The separation between candidates and independent expenditure groups negates the possibility 
that independent expenditures will result in the sort of quid pro quo corruption with which our case law 
is concerned.”); Karlan, supra note 25, at 34 (“The juxtaposition of Justice Kennedy’s breezy 
confidence in Citizens United that no amount of money in the form of independent expenditures 
sloshing through the system will ‘cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy’ is hard to square 
with Purcell’s concern that even the specter of voter impersonation ‘drives honest citizens out of the 
democratic process and breeds distrust of our government.’” (first quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 
360; and then quoting Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (per curiam))). 
99 Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per curiam); see also 
Karlan, supra note 25, at 35 (agreeing that American Tradition Partnership “dr[o]ve[] home” the point 
that “Citizens United reflected a philosophical, rather than an empirical, position on money’s effect on 
politics”). 
100 Am. Tradition P’ship, 132 S. Ct. at 2491 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
101 Id. (majority opinion). The Court’s campaign finance decisions have not always approached 
evidentiary requirements and tailoring in quite this way. At least some earlier rulings asked more of 
challengers and required less of the government. In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, which 
addressed Missouri’s state contribution limits, the challengers criticized the state for failing to offer 
“empirical evidence of actually corrupt practices or of a perception among Missouri voters that 
unrestricted contributions must have been exerting a covertly corrosive influence.” 528 U.S. 377, 390–
91 (2000). Rejecting that argument and upholding the law, the Court wrote that “[t]he quantum of 
empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up 
or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised.” Id. at 391. According to the Court, 
“Buckley demonstrate[d] that the dangers of large, corrupt contributions and the suspicion that large 
contributions are corrupt are neither novel nor implausible.” Id. Thus, while acknowledging that “mere 
conjecture” is not “adequate to carry a First Amendment burden,” the Court treated the “State’s 
evidentiary obligation” as modest. Id. at 392–93. It indicated that it would demand “more extensive 
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E. Legislative Motives
The differing demands that the Court has placed on the government in 
its recent voting and spending cases may relate in part to the Court’s 
divergent sensibilities about regulatory incentives and lawmakers’ 
motivations. On the voting side, the Court has expressed respect for 
lawmakers’ judgment and expertise while downplaying their possible 
ulterior motives. On the spending side, it is the reverse. 
In Crawford, the plurality spoke of its disinclination when reviewing a 
voting regulation to “frustrate[] the intent of the elected representatives of 
the people.”102 The plurality acknowledged that it was “fair to infer that 
partisan considerations may have played a significant role in the [Indiana 
legislature’s] decision to enact [its voter ID law].”103 Nonetheless, it 
reasoned that, as long as the law was “supported by valid neutral 
justifications,” the fact that “partisan interests may have provided one 
motivation for the votes of individual legislators” was not enough to 
invalidate it.104  
At one time, the Court’s campaign finance rulings were similarly 
deferential to the lawmaking process. In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri 
Government PAC, Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion described legislators 
as having “significantly greater institutional expertise . . . in the field of 
election regulation” than courts.105 Justice Breyer remarked that, as a 
consequence, the Court’s practice was to “defer[] to empirical legislative 
judgments—at least where that deference does not risk such constitutional 
evils as, say, permitting incumbents to insulate themselves from effective 
evidentiary documentation” only if a law’s challengers first come forward with evidence of their own 
sufficient to “cast doubt” on the plausibility of the State’s regulatory rationale. Id. at 394. The 
challengers to Missouri’s law had offered a few “academic studies said to indicate that large 
contributions to public officials or candidates do not actually result in changes in candidates’ position.” 
Id. But the Court viewed these as inadequate given that “[o]ther studies . . . point[ed] the other way,” 
and that the cited studies did not question the “public perception” that large contributions are 
corrupting. Id. at 394–95; see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 144–45 (2003) (applying a similar 
approach); Richard L. Hasen, Buckley Is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign Finance 
Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 43 (2004) 
(describing Nixon as a case that “lowered the evidentiary burden for proving corruption or its 
appearance”). 
102 Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 203 (2008) (plurality opinion) (quoting 
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006)). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 204. 
105 528 U.S. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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electoral challenge.”106 The Court repeated and amplified this point a few 
years later in McConnell.107 
The Court’s more recent campaign finance decisions contain no such 
sentiments. To the contrary, the McCutcheon plurality expressed in stark 
terms its distrust of legislators’ motives and unwillingness to defer to 
legislative judgments: “[T]hose who govern should be the last people to 
help decide who should govern.”108 In Citizens United, the dissent pointed 
to similar statements made by members of the majority in prior writings as 
one explanation for the majority’s readiness “to run roughshod over 
Congress’ handiwork.”109 The dissent recounted these Justices’ suggestions 
that portions of BCRA “may be little more than ‘an incumbency protection 
plan,’ a disreputable attempt at legislative self-dealing rather than an 
earnest effort to facilitate First Amendment values and safeguard the 
legitimacy of our political system.”110 Despite following almost 
immediately on the heels of Crawford, neither Citizens United nor other 
recent campaign finance decisions recognize or try to reconcile these 
seemingly dissonant lines of authority. 
II. A JUSTIFIED DIVERGENCE?
Is there a good reason for the strikingly different positions that the 
Supreme Court has taken in its recent voting and spending cases? The 
Court itself has not articulated one. Indeed, given that voting and spending 
cases rarely mention one another, it is not apparent that the Court has fully 
grasped the extent of the disparities identified in Part I. Commentators 
106 Id. 
107 540 U.S. 93, 117, 137, 165–66, 171 (2003); see also Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political 
Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 531 (2004) 
(describing the Court in McConnell as granting “considerable” and “quite remarkable” “deference to 
Congress’s judgments”). 
108 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441–42 (2014) (plurality opinion); see also Josh Chafetz, Governing and 
Deciding Who Governs, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 73, 75 (critiquing the McCutcheon plurality’s “premise 
that the Court stands outside of, and indeed above, the structures and processes of governance”). The 
Court expressed a similar view in Davis v. FEC, which invalidated a provision of BCRA that relaxed 
contribution limits and other regulations for candidates challenging self-financed opponents. See 
554 U.S. 724, 742 (2008) (“The Constitution . . . confers upon voters, not Congress, the power to 
choose the Members of the House of Representatives, and it is a dangerous business for Congress to use 
the election laws to influence the voters’ choices.” (citation omitted)). 
109 558 U.S. 310, 461 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
110 Id. at 460–61 (citation omitted) (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)); see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 263 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The first instinct of power is the retention of power, and, 
under a Constitution that requires periodic elections, that is best achieved by the suppression of 
election-time speech.”). 
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likewise have devoted little attention to the issue.111 The question, however, 
is a significant one. Knowing whether the Court’s divergent approaches can 
be satisfactorily explained sheds light on the Court’s recent rulings and on 
existing scholarly critiques of that body of law. On one hand, if those 
decisions are in sync (or at least not in tension), then changing course in 
one context or the other—something the Court’s critics frequently call 
for—might result in unintended discordance. On the other hand, if the 
Court’s decisions are not readily reconcilable, then perhaps the Court has 
veered off course in one or both sets of cases. Thinking about voting and 
spending more holistically could help get the law back on track. 
This Part considers several potential explanations for the current state 
of the Court’s voting and spending jurisprudence and finds them all 
wanting. One possibility is that the Court’s analysis looks the way it does 
because regulations on voting and spending implicate distinct lines of 
constitutional doctrine. But, as Section II.A explains, such doctrinal 
explanations are largely question begging. Another possibility is to seek to 
justify the current legal landscape by pointing to differences in the nature 
of voting and spending themselves. Voting and spending are no doubt 
distinct activities and need not be subject to identical regulations. But, as 
Section II.B explains, their differences are not closely linked to the Court’s 
particular doctrinal moves.  
A. Explanations Rooted in Constitutional Text and Doctrine
This Section considers two variants of the argument that the Court’s 
recent voting and spending rulings properly reflect differences in the 
underlying constitutional provisions and principles that apply in each 
context. 
1. Equal Protection Versus the First Amendment.—First, one might
contend that challenges to voting regulations implicate the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, while challenges to campaign 
finance regulations raise separate First Amendment issues. According to 
this line of reasoning, because the Equal Protection Clause is principally 
concerned with laws that differentiate between groups of people,112 courts 
should indeed emphasize collective burdens rather than individual ones in 
voting cases. And because established equal protection doctrine generally 
calls for deferential judicial review unless a law draws suspect lines (for 
111 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
112 See, e.g., Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008) (“Our equal protection 
jurisprudence has typically been concerned with governmental classifications that ‘affect some groups 
of citizens differently than others.’” (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961))). 
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example, based on race or gender),113 courts in voting cases should be 
reluctant to second-guess the government’s broadly stated interests. These 
are among the basic doctrinal moves of the Crawford plurality.114 In 
contrast, the First Amendment is principally concerned with the rights of 
individual speakers and places a premium on unfettered discourse.115 
Accordingly, courts should approach campaign finance restrictions with 
skepticism toward the government’s interests and motives. These are 
essentially the animating principles of cases like Citizens United and 
McCutcheon.116  
While this doctrinal account may have some superficial appeal, its 
explanatory power is limited. As a descriptive matter, it oversimplifies the 
current state of voting law in particular. As a conceptual matter, it rests on 
the highly dubious premise that the Equal Protection Clause compels the 
specific analytical features of the Court’s recent voting cases and that the 
First Amendment compels the distinct features of the Court’s recent 
spending cases. These open-ended constitutional guarantees of equality and 
of expressive and associational liberty are not so rigidly deterministic. 
Indeed, given that neither provision expressly refers to voting or spending, 
it is not axiomatic that they are even the right constitutional starting points.  
a. Voting.—On the voting side, the Court’s decisions are not
now, and have never been, exemplars of conventional equal protection 
analysis. While the Court grounded its canonical 1960s-era voting rights 
rulings in “the Fourteenth Amendment’s command that no State shall deny 
persons equal protection of the laws,”117 those decisions did not look to the 
presence or absence of suspect classifications and then ratchet the level of 
judicial scrutiny up or down accordingly. Instead, those decisions applied 
what courts and commentators term “the ‘fundamental rights’ strand of 
equal protection analysis.”118 The notion was that, because the right to vote 
113 See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). 
114 See supra Sections I.B–C. 
115 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1964). 
116 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1448–49 (2014) (plurality opinion); Citizens United 
v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 327, 339–40 (2010).
117 Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969).
118 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786 n.7 (1983); see also Jane S. Schacter,
Unenumerated Democracy: Lessons from the Right to Vote, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 457, 464 (2007) 
(noting that the right to vote “has come to be commonly understood . . . as part of the fundamental 
rights branch of equal protection”). The Court turned to the Equal Protection Clause because the 
Constitution does not affirmatively “confer the right of suffrage upon any one.” Minor v. Happersett, 
88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874). But once a state confers the franchise, the Court has held that the 
Equal Protection Clause gives the state’s citizens “a constitutionally protected right to participate in 
elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction.” Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 
336 (1972); see also Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1982) (similar). 
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is fundamental, a law that precludes people from “exercis[ing] the franchise 
in a free and unimpaired manner” must be “carefully and meticulously 
scrutinized,” whether or not the law involves suspect classifications.119 As 
others have observed, this sort of approach has as much in common with 
First Amendment and substantive due process analyses as it does with 
conventional equal protection analysis.120 
Although the Crawford plurality refrained from invoking the 
sweeping rights-oriented language of earlier voting cases, it likewise 
declined to follow the standard equal protection script.121 The plurality 
derived its balancing approach not from the Court’s general body of equal 
protection jurisprudence, but instead from a line of ballot access cases that 
applied an amalgam of equal protection and First Amendment principles. 
The two principal authorities that the Crawford plurality relied upon make 
this clear.  
First, in Anderson v. Celebrezze, which involved a constitutional 
challenge to restrictive Ohio ballot access rules, the Court stressed that it 
was not relying solely on “prior election cases resting on the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”122 Instead, because ballot 
access restrictions impact the ability of voters (and candidates) to associate 
for political ends, the Court invoked the First Amendment as well.123 
Second and similarly, in Burdick v. Takushi, the Court treated “the 
119 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964); see also Kramer, 395 U.S. at 626 (“This careful 
examination is necessary because statutes distributing the franchise constitute the foundation of our 
representative society. Any unjustified discrimination in determining who may participate in political 
affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy of representative government.”). 
Indeed, if a law denies or abridges the right to vote based on race or sex, the Fifteenth and Nineteenth 
Amendments, rather than the Equal Protection Clause, offer the most straightforward path for relief. 
U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX. 
120 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 
235, 268 (1994) (“Both laws which directly restrict constitutionally privileged conduct such as free 
speech and laws which restrict fundamental rights such as the right to vote must be narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling state interest.”); Deana A. Pollard, Banning Corporal Punishment: A Constitutional 
Analysis, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 447, 491 (2002) (“Government action that interferes with a fundamental 
right may be analyzed under the fundamental rights branch of equal protection, or under a substantive 
due process analysis.”); Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection: On Discretion, 
Inequality, and Participation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2409, 2467 (2003) (observing that the Court has 
departed from its conventional equal protection analysis when “government activities . . . bear critically 
upon political participation”). 
121 See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 207 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
122 460 U.S. at 786 n.7. 
123 See id. at 787–89; see also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (explaining that ballot 
access restrictions “place burdens on two different, although overlapping, kinds of rights—the rights of 
individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, 
regardless of political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively”). 
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individual’s right to vote and his right to associate with others for political 
ends” as inextricably intertwined.124 The Burdick Court rejected a challenge 
to Hawaii’s prohibition on write-in voting only after concluding that the 
law did not unduly encumber “voters’ rights to make free choices and to 
associate politically through the vote.”125 This doctrinal pedigree confirms 
that the plurality’s controlling opinion in Crawford cannot be understood as 
the unavoidable result of conventional equal protection analysis.126 
Going a step further, several scholars have elaborated upon First 
Amendment implications of voting regulations and have urged courts to 
give the First Amendment a more central role in their analysis.127 Some 
suggest that, because voting “is the quintessential act of political 
participation,” restrictions on the franchise necessarily hamper the ability to 
speak and associate.128 Others stress that vote suppression can operate as a 
form of viewpoint discrimination.129  
124 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788). 
125 Id. at 438–39. 
126 Concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia seemed to favor shifting voting rights discourse into 
a more conventional equal protection box. He took the position that  
[a] voter complaining about [a nondiscriminatory] law’s effect on him has no valid equal-
protection claim because, without proof of discriminatory intent, a generally applicable law with
disparate impact is not unconstitutional. The Fourteenth Amendment does not regard neutral
laws as invidious ones, even when their burdens purportedly fall disproportionately on a
protected class. A fortiori it does not do so when, as here, the classes complaining of disparate
impact are not even protected.
Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 207 (2008) (Scalia, J. concurring in the judgment) 
(citation omitted). In his view, “weighing the burden of a nondiscriminatory voting law upon each voter 
and concomitantly requiring exceptions for vulnerable voters would effectively turn back decades of 
equal-protection jurisprudence.” Id. Only two other Justices, however, joined Justice Scalia’s opinion. 
Id. at 204. The fact that a majority of the Court—both the plurality and dissenters—declined to endorse 
these sentiments is further evidence that conventional equal protection principles were not driving the 
controlling analysis. 
127 See, e.g., Tokaji, supra note 120, at 2498 (“[T]here is a common constitutional value underlying 
rights of speech and rights of political participation.”). 
128 Id. at 2509; see also Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Racial Identity, Electoral Structures, and the First 
Amendment Right of Association, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1209, 1250 (2003) (“[A]n electoral law, rule, 
structure, or device that significantly burdens the individual’s right to make free choices and associate 
effectively through the ballot impairs the individual’s right of association.”); cf. Adam Winkler, Note, 
Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 330, 335 (1993) (urging greater consideration of the expressive 
value of voting but recommending against “us[ing] the first amendment as the textual basis for the 
constitutional right to vote”). 
129 See, e.g., Janai S. Nelson, The First Amendment, Equal Protection and Felon 
Disenfranchisement: A New Viewpoint, 65 FLA. L. REV. 111 (2013) (examining felon 
disenfranchisement through the lens of First Amendment viewpoint discrimination analysis); Lori A. 
Ringhand, Voter Viewpoint Discrimination: A First Amendment Challenge to Voter Participation 
Restrictions, 13 ELECTION L.J. 288, 293 (2014) (“[T]he First Amendment path provides a doctrinally 
tested and theoretically sound mechanism through which to disentangle the Anderson-Burdick focus on 
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Members of the Court have signaled interest in such First Amendment 
analysis. Justice Kennedy, for instance, has written in the context of 
partisan gerrymandering that “First Amendment concerns arise where a 
State enacts a law that has the purpose and effect of subjecting a group of 
voters or their party to disfavored treatment by reason of their views.”130 
More recently, the McCutcheon plurality referred to a “First Amendment 
right of citizens to choose who shall govern them.”131 Whether or not courts 
ultimately head down this path, this active discourse about the 
constitutional underpinnings of the right to vote underscores that the 
specific analytic content of the Court’s voting decisions is the product of 
judgment and inertia rather than equal protection imperatives.  
b. Spending.—On the spending side, the story is somewhat
different, but the bottom line is the same: The doctrine does not reflect 
constitutional imperatives. The Court has long grounded its campaign 
finance analysis in the First Amendment. Its recent decisions in particular 
speak in lofty and emphatic terms about the threat that campaign finance 
regulations pose to core First Amendment-protected activities.132 But 
despite the Court’s recent efforts to cast these cases as ones that raise 
quintessential First Amendment issues, campaign finance law remains a 
fairly distinctive and self-contained area of First Amendment doctrine. The 
Court largely avoids analyzing challenged regulations with reference to 
concepts like content and viewpoint neutrality or time, place, and manner 
restrictions—standard fare elsewhere in First Amendment law.133 Instead, 
the Court continues to reference the lines Buckley drew between 
contribution limits, expenditure limits, and disclosure regulations.134 And it 
continues to refine its account of the anticorruption interests that can justify 
campaign finance regulation.135 As with the details of the Court’s voting 
burdensomeness from the separate constitutional harm imposed by intentional voter viewpoint 
discrimination.”). 
130 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
131 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014) (plurality opinion). 
132 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 329 (2010); see also id. at 339 (“The First Amendment 
‘has its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for political office.’” 
(quoting Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989))); McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 
at 1448 (plurality opinion) (“As relevant here, the First Amendment safeguards an individual’s right to 
participate in the public debate through political expression and political association. When an 
individual contributes money to a candidate, he exercises both of those rights . . . .” (citation omitted)); 
Bertrall L. Ross II, Paths of Resistance to Our Imperial First Amendment, 113 MICH. L. REV. 917, 917 
(2015) (“In the campaign finance realm, we are in the age of the imperial First Amendment.”). 
133 See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015); McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 
2518 (2014). 
134 See, e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1444–45 (plurality opinion). 
135 See, e.g., id. at 1450–51. 
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analysis, it is thus difficult to attribute the Court’s specific choices on these 
issues to unequivocal constitutional commands. This point is hammered 
home by the fact that, in several prior cases, a majority of the Court had 
made different analytical judgments and evinced a greater willingness to 
uphold regulations.136 The Court’s most recent rulings invalidating various 
campaign finance measures remain hotly contested among the Justices 
themselves, as well as among scholars and the broader public.137 
2. Article I’s Election Provisions.—A second potential doctrinal
explanation for the Court’s divergent voting and spending analysis involves 
two election-related provisions in Article I of the Constitution. One 
addresses elector qualifications. It essentially provides that individuals are 
qualified to vote in federal congressional elections if their state has deemed 
them eligible to vote in state legislative elections.138 The other, the so-called 
Elections Clause, directs states to handle the logistics of congressional 
elections, subject to congressional oversight.139 These provisions, the Court 
has observed, recognize the reality “that government must play an active 
role in structuring elections.”140 Because regulation of the election process 
is constitutionally approved, one might contend that governments need 
flexibility to set voting-related rules, even though such rules will inevitably 
burden particular voters in one way or another. Along these lines, Justice 
Scalia’s Crawford concurrence cited the Elections Clause to support his 
136 See supra notes 70–73, 102, 106–07 and accompanying text. 
137 See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 393–94 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“The notion that the First Amendment dictates [a ruling in favor of Citizens United] is, in my 
judgment, profoundly misguided.”); id. at 425 (“It is today’s holding that is the radical departure from 
what had been settled First Amendment law.”). There are debates not just about how the First 
Amendment should apply, but also about whether and to what extent First Amendment analysis should 
even govern challenges to campaign finance regulations. Justice Stevens at one time suggested that, 
because campaign finance regulations affect a person’s ability to “mak[e] decisions about the use of his 
or her property,” due process might provide a more apt source for the Court’s rules of decision. Nixon 
v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398–99 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring). A few scholars have
developed this position further. See, e.g., Spencer A. Overton, Mistaken Identity: Unveiling the
Property Characteristics of Political Money, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1235, 1236–37 (2000) (proposing “that
courts consider both constitutional speech doctrines and constitutional property doctrines in developing
a new approach to judicial review of campaign finance restrictions”). 
138 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“[T]he Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite 
for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.”). 
139 Id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at 
any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”). 
140 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992); see also id. at 441 (“[T]he right to vote is the 
right to participate in an electoral process that is necessarily structured to maintain the integrity of the 
democratic system.”); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (“[A]s a practical matter, there must 
be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather 
than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.”). 
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view that “detailed judicial supervision of the [voting] process would flout 
the Constitution’s express commitment of the task to the States.”141 
Meanwhile, campaign finance regulation could be cast as less central to 
electoral superintendence and thus subject to greater judicial skepticism—
or, at the federal level, perhaps held to exceed Congress’s powers 
entirely.142 
Again, whatever initial plausibility this argument might have, it 
collapses upon closer inspection. For starters, the Court has never endorsed 
the view that the Elections Clause differentiates between voting and 
spending, authorizing regulation of the former but not the latter. To the 
contrary, the Court in McConnell specifically rejected an argument “that 
Congress . . . overstepped its Elections Clause power in enacting BCRA.”143 
Buckley likewise viewed it as “well established” that Congress had power 
to regulate elections writ large, including their financing.144 Since that 
decision, the Court has consistently accepted that the “critical constitutional 
questions” in campaign finance cases “go not to the basic power of 
Congress to legislate in this area, but to whether the specific legislation that 
Congress has enacted interferes with First Amendment freedoms” or 
violates other constitutional constraints.145 Consistent with this 
understanding, the Court recently reiterated in a non-campaign finance case 
that “[t]he [Elections] Clause’s substantive scope is broad[,] . . . 
‘embrac[ing] authority to provide a complete code for congressional 
elections.’”146 
Moreover, even if Article I conferred broader authority to regulate 
voting than spending, that would not necessarily justify differential judicial 
treatment of voting and spending regulations, much less the specific kind of 
differential treatment reflected in the Court’s recent opinions. There are at 
least two reasons. 
First, powers granted in Article I cannot be understood in isolation 
from the various constraints that the Constitution elsewhere imposes on the 
exercise of governmental authority. As the Court has put it, “the 
Constitution is filled with provisions that grant Congress or the States 
141 553 U.S. 181, 208 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
142 See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, The Original Scope of the Congressional Power to Regulate 
Elections, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 43–46 (2010) (contending that the Elections Clause does not 
authorize federal campaign finance laws); Bradley A. Smith, Separation of Campaign and State, 
81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2038, 2056–57 (2013) (same). 
143 540 U.S. 93, 187 (2003). 
144 424 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1976) (per curiam). 
145 Id. 
146 Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2253 (2013) (quoting Smiley v. 
Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932)). 
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specific power to legislate in certain areas; these granted powers are always 
subject to the limitation that they may not be exercised in a way that 
violates other specific provisions of the Constitution.”147 Thus, 
notwithstanding the scope of the authority initially conferred in Article I, 
other constitutional provisions could ultimately justify subjecting voting 
regulations to equal or greater judicial scrutiny than spending regulations. 
For instance, while Article I grants states broad power to set elector 
qualifications, a host of constitutional amendments and judicial precedents 
significantly constrain states’ ability to limit the electorate.148 
Second, just because the Constitution broadly authorizes Congress and 
the states to establish ground rules for voting does not necessarily mean 
that it countenances burdensome rules. Indeed, given the fundamental 
nature of the vote, the Elections Clause could conceivably be viewed as 
conferring authority to regulate federal elections primarily in ways that 
facilitate the exercise of the franchise by qualified electors. Under this 
view, regulations that operate to make the voting process less open and 
accessible would be presumptively invalid. 
In short, to the extent there is discordance in voting and spending 
jurisprudence, “the Constitution is not to blame.”149 Instead, as other 
scholars have suggested, the doctrine reflects the “distinct perspective” that 
the Court in recent years has brought to bear on election law questions.150 
To determine whether the Court’s perspective is justifiable, it is therefore 
necessary to consider the nature of voting and spending. 
147 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968). 
148 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XV (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not 
be denied or abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”); id. amend. 
XIX (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . . on account 
of sex.”); id. amend. XXIV (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote [in federal elections] 
shall not be denied or abridged . . . by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.”); id. amend. 
XXVI (“The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall 
not be denied or abridged . . . on account of age.”); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 
621, 627 (1969) (holding that strict scrutiny applies when a “state statute grants the right to vote to 
some bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to others”); Harper v. 
Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (holding that voting eligibility cannot be conditioned on 
the payment of a poll tax even in the context of state and local elections). 
149 Ellen D. Katz, Election Law’s Lochnerian Turn, 94 B.U. L. REV. 697, 709 (2014).  
150 Id.; cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing the 
Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 57, 150 (1997) (discussing “[t]he Court’s role in implementing the 
Constitution through doctrine” and concluding that, “[m]uch more often than is commonly recognized, 
a gap exists between constitutional norms and the doctrine crafted by courts to implement those 
norms”). 
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B. Explanations Rooted in the Nature of Voting and Spending
If the Court’s divergent voting and spending analysis is not the
product of doctrinal necessity, perhaps it nevertheless sensibly accounts for 
distinctions between the two activities. This Section considers the 
possibility that the jurisprudence of voting and spending differs because 
voting and spending differ.  
Voting and spending are no doubt distinct activities that need not be 
governed by identical rules. Perhaps most significantly, voting has 
immediate legal ramifications that spending lacks. It is a direct exercise of 
political authority. As Jeremy Waldron has put it, “[t]o vote is . . . to 
perform an action which (if enough others also perform it) alters the 
assignment of rights and duties in the community.”151 For this reason, 
voting is a singularly foundational aspect of democratic governance,152 and 
the ability to vote is synonymous with “full membership in society” in a 
way that the ability to spend is not.153 To put a finer point on it, imagine 
two political systems: one in which most members of the populace can and 
do vote in elections, but cannot or do not spend money on elections, and 
another in which most members of the populace can and do spend money 
on elections, but cannot or do not vote in elections. We would surely 
consider the first system to be more democratic, whatever objections we 
might have to its spending restrictions. 
151 Jeremy Waldron, Participation: The Right of Rights, 98 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 307, 309 
(1998). 
152 See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (“It is beyond cavil that ‘voting is of the 
most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure.’” (quoting Ill. Bd. of Elections v. 
Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979))); Carole Pateman, Participatory Democracy 
Revisited, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 7, 15 (2012) (describing “universal suffrage” as “that very minimal but 
emblematic requirement for democracy”); Martin H. Redish & Abby Marie Mollen, Understanding 
Post’s and Meiklejohn’s Mistakes: The Central Role of Adversary Democracy in the Theory of Free 
Expression, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1303, 1327 (2009) (“The vote is the most basic exercise of self-
determination, the only guarantee that the people remain sovereign over their government, the principle 
distinction between democracy and autocracy, and the principal (if not the only) means for individuals 
in an unequal society to have an objectively equal say in their collective government.”); Tokaji, supra 
note 120, at 2509 (referring to voting as “the quintessential act of political participation”). 
153 JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 2 (1991); see also 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964) (“To the extent that a citizen’s right to vote is debased, he 
is that much less a citizen.”); 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 239 (1991) (“[V]oting is the 
paradigmatic form of universal citizenship participation.”); SHKLAR, supra, at 17 (suggesting that one 
who lacks the vote is “less than a full citizen”); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 4: Political 
Equality, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 4 (1987) (explaining that, through the vote, “[t]he community confirms 
an individual person’s membership, as a free and equal citizen”); James A. Gardner, Liberty, 
Community and the Constitutional Structure of Political Influence: A Reconsideration of the Right to 
Vote, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 893, 906 (1997) (“To seek the vote is to seek formal recognition as a full 
member of society; to be denied the vote is to be either excluded altogether from membership in the 
community or consigned to some kind of second-class citizenship.”). 
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At the same time, precisely because voting serves to allocate 
governmental power, it is necessarily part of a formalized system. The 
franchise is a legal construct. It requires rules governing voter eligibility, 
the vote-casting process, and the aggregation of votes to determine 
winners.154 Again, Waldron’s description is apt:  
The right to vote is not a matter of negative freedom to express a preference 
for one’s favourite politician, and it is not secured by the individual’s simply 
being left alone by the state to do this when he pleases. One has the right to 
vote only if one’s vote is counted and given effect in a system of collective 
decision that determines policy, leadership and authority.155  
The rules of voting need not be elaborate, but there must be rules. 
Spending, in contrast, does not require the same sort of structure. It 
can occur more organically, although it may be an exaggeration to describe 
electoral spending as a pure negative liberty. For one thing, one’s decisions 
about whether, when, and how to spend on elections are inevitably shaped 
by the rules of the voting process. It would make little sense, for instance, 
to contribute to or make expenditures on behalf of putative candidates who 
are left off the ballot or to spend money seeking to sway the votes of people 
who are ineligible to cast ballots. For another, background rules concerning 
property rights, tax liability, and the like can impact one’s ability to engage 
in electoral spending, whether or not the drafters of such rules so intend.156 
In addition, the line between voting regulations and spending regulations is 
not always bright: Are laws that prohibit the buying and selling of votes 
voting regulations or spending regulations? Yet even with these caveats, an 
electoral system with minimal spending regulations may be easier to 
imagine than one with minimal voting regulations. 
These conceptual differences between voting and spending matter. 
They may help to account for some deeply ingrained divergences in the law 
and practice of voting and spending. For instance, voting jurisprudence has 
long been concerned with ensuring equality in the exercise of the franchise. 
154 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; id. § 4, cl. 1. 
155 Waldron, supra note 151, at 309; see also Dorf, supra note 120, at 265–66 (identifying the right 
to vote as a “right that can be exercised only in a government-created forum,” distinct from rights to 
engage in primary conduct). 
156 Cf. David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
1369, 1384 (1994) (“It might be objected that a vote is purely an artificial creation, while a contribution 
consists of the contributor’s own money. The government may distribute its own artificial creations in a 
way designed to bring about equality, but it may not go so far in limiting how people use their own 
property in expressive activities. As stated, this objection overlooks the basic insight that property rights 
too are a creation of the state. . . . There is no necessary reason that they cannot be limited further to 
promote political equality. It would not be ‘wholly foreign,’ or even mildly questionable, to argue for a 
progressive income tax on the ground that disparities of wealth can undermine democracy.”). 
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The “one person, one vote” principle is exhibit A.157 Because votes directly 
underwrite democratic self-governance, it strikes most people as self-
evident that votes should be allocated equally, and one person’s vote 
should count no more than another’s.158 In contrast, despite calls from some 
reformers to import equality principles from the voting context into the 
campaign finance context,159 the law has long been more accepting of 
inequalities when it comes to campaign finance. The Supreme Court has 
gone so far as to disavow categorically the notion that the government has a 
valid interest in equalizing election spending.160 Whatever one’s views on 
the propriety of that disavowal, the fact that election-related spending is a 
step removed from the legally decisive act of voting does seem to render 
the case for strict equality less compelling. As troubled as many are by the 
prospect that vastly unequal spending power may give some people an 
outsized influence in the electoral process, they would no doubt be more 
troubled still by a system that unequally allocated votes. 
The conceptual differences between voting and spending also may be 
relevant to understanding our longstanding practice of protecting the 
secrecy of the vote while requiring at least some disclosure of electoral 
spending.161 The adoption of the secret ballot in the late nineteenth and 
157 See, e.g., Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1129 (2016) (describing “the principle of 
representational equality” as central to the Constitution’s design); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 560–61 (“[T]he 
fundamental principle of representative government in this country is one of equal representation for 
equal numbers of people, without regard to race, sex, economic status, or place of residence within a 
State.”); id. at 561 (referring to “the basic standard of equality among voters in the apportionment of 
seats in state legislatures”); id. at 565 (“Full and effective participation by all citizens in state 
government requires . . . that each citizen have an equally effective voice in the election of members of 
his state legislature.”). 
158 See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 18, at 68–69 (“The expansion of the franchise towards universal 
adult citizen suffrage, the invalidation of poll taxes and wealth tests for voting and candidacy, and the 
adoption of the one person, one vote rule for legislative apportionment reflect a commitment to 
providing all members of the community with an equal opportunity to participate in the electoral 
process and, to that extent, a relatively equal opportunity to influence government decision-making.”). 
159 See, e.g., Foley, supra note 21, at 1206 (“The principle of equal-dollars-per-voter means that 
each eligible voter should receive the same amount of financial resources for the purpose of 
participating in electoral politics.”); cf. Briffault, supra note 18, at 68–69 (“Analogizing campaign 
money to voting, reformers would extend the political equality norm at the heart of our theory of 
democratic self-government to the financing of campaigns by curbing the role of unequal private wealth 
in fueling the campaign finance system.”). 
160 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 350 (2010) (“Buckley rejected the premise that 
the Government has an interest ‘in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence 
the outcome of elections.’” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) (per curiam))). 
161 See Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273, 294 (2010) 
(“Campaign finance has diverged from the balloting process over the last century. Although Americans 
are strongly committed to the confidentiality of the vote, campaign finance transparency has ‘become a 
hallmark of democratic representation.’” (quoting Stephen Ansolabehere, The Scope of Corruption: 
Lessons from Comparative Campaign Finance Disclosure, 6 ELECTION L.J. 163, 174 (2007))). 
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early twentieth century helped to guard against voter coercion and vote 
buying, which threatened the integrity of election results.162 The idea was to 
make it easier for people to vote their conscience. In the spending context, 
the prevailing view has been that secrecy poses a bigger threat to electoral 
integrity, and that disclosure helps voters make better judgments.163  
Some challenge these conclusions. John Stuart Mill long ago defended 
public voting as a way to induce voters to act responsibly.164 And a few 
scholars have recently suggested that having electoral spending occur 
behind a “veil of ignorance” might alleviate the pathologies of corruption 
and coercion.165 The objective here, however, is not to establish that our 
existing secrecy–transparency judgments are necessarily the right ones. 
Instead, it is merely to suggest that such judgments do seem reasonably 
connected to concerns that separately arise in the voting and spending 
contexts, respectively. 
Conceptual differences between voting and spending may thus 
account for and perhaps justify treating the activities differently in certain 
respects. The more pertinent question, however, is whether those 
conceptual differences provide a convincing rationale for the particular 
doctrinal moves that the Court has made in its recent voting and spending 
cases. They do not. To the contrary, full consideration of the nature of 
voting and spending suggests flaws in the Court’s approach. 
Consider the Court’s assessment of regulatory burdens. This may be 
where the conceptual differences between voting and spending come 
closest to explaining the Court’s divergent approach, but the explanation is 
partial at best. Specifically, the fact that the right to vote can only be 
exercised in a structured setting could counsel in favor of a relatively 
uncritical attitude toward burdens, at least if they are not glaringly severe or 
widespread; some such burdens may be inevitable. Meanwhile, because 
spending can occur with minimal regulation, any burdens on the right to 
162 See, e.g., James A. Gardner, Anonymity and Democratic Citizenship, 19 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 927, 943 (2011) (“The principle justification for introducing the secret ballot . . . was to break 
the control that parties were thought to exercise over voters by depriving them of the ability to enforce 
discipline at the polls.”). 
163 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 371 (“[D]isclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to the 
speech of corporate entities in a proper way. This transparency enables the electorate to make informed 
decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages.”). 
164 JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 203–08 (Gateway 
ed., Henry Regnery Co. 1962). 
165 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, The Secret Refund Booth, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1107, 
1108 (2006) (“Once politicians cannot know who gave them how much, they cannot reward big givers 
with political favors. The veil of ignorance serves the cause of good government better than superficial 
transparency, liberating politicians to elaborate a conception of the public good that will appeal to the 
broad majority of their constituents.”). 
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spend might seem inherently suspect. But such an account ignores the 
centrality of voting to maintaining the democratic order. Voting’s unique 
democracy-facilitating function, and the status of the right to vote as a 
special marker of inclusion, suggests a need for burdens to be carefully and 
individually scrutinized—perhaps more so than burdens on the right to 
spend. 
The other analytical features of the Court’s recent voting and spending 
cases are even more difficult to justify. Perhaps the formal status of the 
vote gives the government’s interest in ensuring electoral integrity special 
urgency when it comes to setting voting rules. But it is difficult to see why 
that interest should be disregarded entirely in the spending context in favor 
of exclusive reliance on a narrowly framed anticorruption interest.  
Similarly, it is not apparent why the sufficiency of government’s 
regulatory rationales should be more readily accepted in the voting context 
than the spending context. Again, the foundational nature of franchise 
suggests that the judiciary should carefully consider whether voting 
regulations actually advance the government’s interests in a manner 
commensurate with the burdens they impose. As for the government’s 
regulatory motives, the conceptual differences between voting and 
spending offer no clear support for the Court’s assumption that legislators 
are more trustworthy when they enact voting regulations rather than 
spending regulations. If anything, the fact that voting has a more direct and 
immediate impact on the distribution of political power would seem to 
suggest that we should be more concerned that legislators will have strong 
incentives to try to advantage themselves and their allies through voting 
rules as opposed to spending rules. 
Moreover, while this Section has focused thus far on the differences 
between voting and spending, their important similarities cast further doubt 
on the Court’s divergent analytical moves in recent voting and spending 
cases. As McCutcheon’s opening paragraph suggests, voting in elections 
and spending on elections are both methods of democratic engagement.166 
As an instrumental matter, voting and spending both shape the political 
order by affecting how the government conducts its business.167 By casting 
votes and spending dollars, people endeavor to give power to leaders who 
166 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1440–41 (2014) (plurality opinion). 
167 Strauss, supra note 156, at 1383 (“A campaign contribution or expenditure, like a vote, is in part 
an effort to influence the outcome of an election.”); see also Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288 
(D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012) (“Political contributions and express-advocacy 
expenditures are an integral aspect of the process by which Americans elect officials to federal, state, 
and local government offices.”); Yasmin Dawood, Campaign Finance and American Democracy, 
18 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 329, 340 (2015) (“It has long been acknowledged that campaign finance 
regulation has implications for both electoral and legislative outcomes.”). 
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share their values and will respond to their concerns. Relatedly, people can 
use their votes and their dollars—or the threat of withholding votes and 
dollars—to try to mold their leaders’ values and priorities.168 Meanwhile, 
from a less instrumental and more dignity-oriented perspective, spending 
and voting are both ways for people to partake in the project of self-
governance,169 although enfranchisement may have special status as a badge 
of social inclusion.170 Voting and spending are also both vehicles for 
association among like-minded compatriots and for the expression of 
political views.171  
These shared attributes of voting and spending not only bolster the 
conclusion that the doctrinal divergences identified in Part I are unjustified; 
they also suggest that it is indeed time to begin thinking about voting and 
spending more holistically. Part III takes up that task. 
III. THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE AS A WAY FORWARD
Given that voting and spending share a common participatory core, 
one might expect voting jurisprudence and spending jurisprudence to be 
more closely connected. Instead, inertia has long carried them down 
separate tracks, which helps explain why the law has been able to diverge 
in some seemingly unjustifiable ways. With a number of high-profile 
voting and spending controversies still fresh in mind, and the prospect of 
more in the near future,172 this is an especially opportune time to ask 
168 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part) (“[A] substantial and legitimate reason, if not the only reason, to cast a vote for, 
or to make a contribution to, one candidate over another is that the candidate will respond by producing 
those political outcomes the supporter favors. Democracy is premised on responsiveness.”). 
169 See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional 
Argument: Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443, 451 (1989) (“[I]n a constitutive understanding, the point 
of engagement in politics lies not in any ulterior end but in the ends-affecting—the dialogic—
experience of the engagement itself.”). 
170 See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 YALE L.J. 1286, 1343 (2012) (“Voting is 
understood to be emblematic of ‘social standing’ and ‘civic dignity.’” (quoting SHKLAR, supra note 
153, at 2–3)). 
171 In both cases, however, the communicative content of the message is limited. Votes and 
contributions convey support for a candidate, but without nuance; independent expenditures may be 
used to finance the dissemination of more detailed messages, but even then the spender may not have 
chosen the content. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 156, at 1383 (“[V]oting is not exactly the same thing 
as speech. But campaign contributions and expenditures are also not exactly the same thing as speech, 
and voting has much in common with campaign contributions.”); Laurence H. Tribe, Erog .v Hsub and 
Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from Its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170, 242 (2001) (“A 
voter does not express any particularized view about a given candidate when she casts a ballot, other 
than her endorsement of that candidate, or slate of candidates, for public office.”).  
172 See supra note 15. 
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whether a more unified approach might help to reconcile the law’s current 
incongruities. 
Specifically, this Part explores McCutcheon’s insight that voting and 
spending are two manifestations of a broader right to participate in 
elections. It begins by considering the theoretical and constitutional 
foundations of such a right and then offers some thoughts on how the right 
might be operationalized. The objective is not to provide definitive 
accounts of the right and its potential applications. Those tasks would 
require articles of their own. Instead, these are initial reflections on the 
nature, source, and utility of the right in an effort to assess whether it 
indeed offers a promising path forward. This Part concludes that it does. 
A. Foundations of the Right
Popular participation is the lifeblood of democracy. Political theorists 
and election law scholars offer varying accounts of participation’s precise 
value and function, but they all proceed from the same basic premise that 
democratic governance is and must be a participatory affair.173 Democracy 
is, after all, a system of popular sovereignty.174 Its animating principle is 
that the people ultimately control the government and not the other way 
around. That is where elections come in. Elections are, in Samuel 
Issacharoff’s words, “the ultimate—albeit imperfect—mechanism for 
ensuring accountability to the governed and legitimacy in the exercise of 
power by the governors.”175 Elections foster legitimacy—in colloquial 
terms, government of and by the people—by assuring that those who 
exercise public authority do so with the people’s imprimatur. Elections 
foster accountability—government for the people—by giving the people an 
173 See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 1 (1971); CAROLE
PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 103 (1970) (noting the “central role of 
participation in the theory of democracy”); Chad Flanders, How to Think About Voter Fraud (and Why), 
41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 93, 151 (2007) (“Courts do not need to develop a well-worked out theory of 
democracy in order to say that participation is essential to democracy.”). 
174 See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (“[I]n our system, while sovereign 
powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by 
whom and for whom all government exists and acts.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 182 (James 
Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003) (“[W]e may define a republic to be . . . a government which derives 
all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people; and is administered by persons 
holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behaviour. It is essential to 
such a government, that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable 
proportion, or a favored class of it . . . .”). 
175 Samuel Issacharoff, Surreply, Why Elections?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 684, 694–95 (2002); see also 
Stephanopoulos, supra note 26, at 287 (describing elections as “the key instrument for producing . . . 
alignment” between the preferences of voters and their representatives). 
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opportunity to revoke the authority of representatives whose performance 
disappoints. 
By participating in the electoral process, individuals assert themselves 
as members of a self-governing community and help to ensure “the 
continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its 
citizens, considered as political equals.”176 While voting is a quintessential, 
indispensible mode of electoral participation, it is not the only one. As a 
descriptive matter, McCutcheon was surely right to recognize that there are 
additional ways to participate—by running for office, volunteering to work 
on campaigns, making financial contributions, and more.177 
These observations about democracy and electoral participation are 
not idle musings; they are central to our constitutional tradition.178 While 
the Constitution does not explicitly refer to a “right to participate” in the 
electoral process, it is not difficult to glean such a right from the 
document’s very design. This may be one reason why McCutcheon’s 
conspicuous reference to the “right to participate” generated no apparent 
controversy within the Court, including among those Justices who tend to 
be most skeptical of judicially inferred rights.179 Past references to the right 
have likewise provoked little fuss.180 McCutcheon marked the first time that 
a controlling opinion featured the right to participate so prominently, but an 
ideologically diverse group of Justices has alluded to the concept in recent 
years. Justice Thomas, for instance, has described “citizen participation in 
176 DAHL, supra note 173, at 1 (describing such responsiveness as “a key characteristic of a 
democracy”); see also Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 
71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1710 (1993) (describing the “civic inclusion” aspect of participating through 
voting). 
177 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) (plurality opinion). 
178 See, e.g., POST, supra note 24, at 165 (“[T]he ideal of self-government . . . deserves secure 
recognition in our constitutional doctrine.”); Overton, supra note 20, at 1274 (“A principle of 
participation has animated American constitutional discussion since the founding of the nation.”). 
179 Justice Scalia joined the Chief Justice’s plurality opinion. 134 S. Ct. at 1440 (plurality opinion). 
Justice Thomas concurred separately, but expressed no disagreement with the Chief Justice’s opening 
remarks. Id. at 1462–65 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
180 The phrase “right to participate,” or a close variant, has appeared in several majority opinions. 
The Court sometimes has used the phrase “right to participate” simply as a synonym for the right to 
vote. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (“There is no need to repeat now the 
labors undertaken in earlier cases to analyze this right to vote . . . . In decision after decision, this Court 
has made clear that a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal 
basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction.”). In other instances, it has used the language of 
participation to convey something broader, though usually still with special emphasis on voting. See, 
e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 124 (1996) (“The basic right to participate in political processes as
voters and candidates cannot be limited to those who can pay for a license.”); Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964) (“[E]ach and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective
participation in the political processes of his State’s legislative bodies. Most citizens can achieve this
participation only as qualified voters through the election of legislators to represent them.”). 
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[our electoral] processes” as “essential to the functioning of our 
participatory democracy.”181 And in a case decided within a month of 
McCutcheon, Justice Sotomayor referred to “the right to participate 
meaningfully and equally in self-government” as “the bedrock of our 
democracy.”182 These Justices may differ in the details of what they have in 
mind, but at least at a high level of generality, they seem to agree that a 
right to participate naturally follows from our constitutional commitment to 
representative government. And perhaps it is no exaggeration to say that it 
is part and parcel of any system of representative government.183 
Of course, from a contemporary perspective, it is easy to criticize the 
Framers for what they did not do with respect to electoral participation. The 
Constitution includes no express affirmative guarantee of the right to vote; 
it offers limited guidance about how elections should be structured; it 
establishes no independent institutions to superintend the electoral process; 
as originally written, it provided for only one portion of one branch of the 
181 Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 228 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Purcell v. Gonzalez, 
549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (per curiam)). Doe involved whether a state may publicly disclose the identities of 
individuals who sign ballot initiative petitions. Id. at 229. Justice Thomas expressed concern that the 
state’s disclosure practice needlessly “chill[ed] citizen participation in the referendum process.” Id. at 
228–29. 
182 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for 
Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1651 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); 
see also id. at 1667 (“Few rights are as fundamental as the right to participate meaningfully and equally 
in the process of government.”). Justice Sotomayor would have held that a state constitution’s 
prohibition on affirmative action improperly reconfigured the state’s political processes to the detriment 
of minority groups. Id. at 1651–54. Justice Scalia, too, has invoked the right to participate. Dissenting in 
Edwards v. Aguillard, he insisted that it “would deprive religious men and women of their right to 
participate in the political process” if a law were invalidated on Establishment Clause grounds “merely 
because it was supported strongly by organized religions or by adherents of particular faiths.” 482 U.S. 
578, 615 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
183 Several foundational international law documents recognize a right to participate as 
fundamental to any form of representative government. See, e.g., African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, art. 13, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217, 248 (“Every citizen shall have the right to 
participate freely in the government of his country, either directly or through freely chosen 
representatives in accordance with the provisions of the law.”); American Convention on Human 
Rights: “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica,” art. 23, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 151 (“Every citizen 
shall enjoy the following rights and opportunities: a. To take part in the conduct of public affairs, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives; b. To vote and to be elected in genuine periodic 
elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and by secret ballot that guarantees the free 
expression of the will of the voters . . . .”); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 25, 
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179 (“Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity . . . 
without unreasonable restrictions: (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through 
freely chosen representatives; (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be 
by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of 
the will of the electors . . . .”); G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 21 
(Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or 
through freely chosen representatives.”). 
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federal government to be popularly elected.184 In addition, the Framers’ 
views and assumptions about matters of race, gender, and the like 
undeniably limited their participatory vision.185 Nevertheless, given the 
document’s vintage, what is remarkable is not that the Constitution says so 
little about participation, but that it says so much. By the standards of the 
time, it reflected a bold commitment to popular sovereignty and gave the 
people tremendous say in selecting their leaders. 
Indeed, the building blocks of the right to participate are scattered 
across the Constitution and its amendments, beginning with the Preamble’s 
recognition of the paramount authority of “We the People.”186 The original 
document gave “the People of the several States” direct responsibility for 
choosing members of the House of Representatives through periodic 
elections, and the Seventeenth Amendment provided for senators to be 
popularly chosen as well.187 To ensure that elections would indeed be held, 
Article I’s Elections Clause requires states to prescribe their “Times, 
Places, and Manner,” and, in an effort to mitigate the risk that a state might 
fail to act or might act inappropriately, the Clause further authorizes 
Congress to “make or alter” election-related regulations “at any time.”188 
Article I also provides that, when congressional vacancies arise, “the 
Executive Authority [of the relevant state] shall issue Writs of Election to 
fill [them].”189 Significantly, the election-related provisions of Articles I 
and II are among the only instances in which the Constitution affirmatively 
mandates state action, which underscores the significance of elections to 
the constitutional order.190  
While Article I’s Elections Clause does give the states a measure of 
control over who may exercise the franchise in federal elections,191 its 
184 See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 3–6, 15 (5th ed. 2016). 
185 See, e.g., Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987). 
186 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
187 Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; id. amend. XVII. 
188 Id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at 
any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”). 
189 Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 4. 
190 Article II, § 1, cl. 2 provides that “[e]ach State shall appoint [Presidential electors], in such 
Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.” Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. The only other constitutional 
provision that is arguably phrased as a requirement of state action is the Full Faith and Credit Clause of 
Article IV, § 1. It declares that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, 
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.” Id. art. IV, § 1. But that requirement is more 
narrowly ministerial than the Constitution’s election-related directives. 
191 See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“[T]he Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for 
Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.”). 
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language should not be read as a broad license to limit electoral 
participation. This is particularly true in light of later amendments that 
protect the right to vote against abridgement on various grounds.192 Instead, 
what may be more notable about the Elections Clause is its implicit 
recognition of the need for states to have popularly elected legislatures of 
their own. That inference is bolstered by the Guarantee Clause of Article 
IV, which instructs that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State 
in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”193  
Consistent with this understanding, the Framers repeatedly stressed 
the Constitution’s commitment to widespread public participation in the 
selection of government officials. Madison was especially vocal and 
eloquent in this regard. In Federalist No. 39, he described the Constitution 
as being premised on “the capacity of mankind for self-government.”194 He 
continued: “It is essential to such a government, that it be derived from the 
great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a 
favored class of it . . . .”195 Along similar lines, he declared in Federalist No. 
57 that the “electors are to be the great body of the people of the United 
States,” “[n]ot the rich more than the poor; not the learned more than the 
ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the 
humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune.”196 Madison envisioned 
not just an expansively defined electorate, but also a diverse array of 
potential candidates for office: “No qualification of wealth, of birth, of 
religious faith, or of civil profession, is permitted to fetter the judgment or 
disappoint the inclination of the people.”197 Similar views were expressed 
during state ratifying conventions.198  
Over time, constitutional amendments, judicial rulings, and legislation 
have combined to address at least some of the original Constitution’s 
192 See id. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI. 
193 Id. art. IV, § 4. 
194 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 174, at 182 (James Madison). 
195 Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 174, at 170 (James Madison) (“The genius of 
Republican liberty, seems to demand . . . not only that all power should be derived from the people; but, 
that those entrusted with it should be kept in dependence on the people . . . .”). 
196 THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, supra note 174, at 278 (James Madison). The quoted language refers 
specifically to the selection of members of the House of Representatives, as they were the only federal 
officials who were originally directly elected.  
197 Id. 
198 See, e.g., 1 THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK 40 (Vassar Brothers Institute 1905) (1788) (reporting Hamilton’s statement at the 
New York convention that “the true principle of a republic is, that the people should choose whom they 
please to govern them” and that “[t]his great source of free government, popular election, should be 
perfectly pure, and the most unbounded liberty allowed”); see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 
486, 540–41 (1969) (recounting Hamilton’s statement).  
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shortcomings and to reaffirm and strengthen its participatory 
underpinnings. Consider first the Bill of Rights. As Akhil Amar has 
astutely observed, the first ten amendments were ratified not merely to 
protect various personal liberties from political majorities, but also to 
facilitate popular sovereignty and make government a more faithful agent 
of the people.199 True, none of these amendments are election-specific, but 
some unquestionably bear on electoral participation, and an implicit 
commitment to representative government suffuses the Bill of Rights as a 
whole.  
The First Amendment’s role is especially prominent. By safeguarding 
the freedom to speak, publish, assemble, and petition,200 the First 
Amendment serves, in the Supreme Court’s words, “to ensure that the 
individual citizen can effectively participate in and contribute to our 
republican system of self-government.”201 Meanwhile, the grand and petit 
jury requirements of the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments provide the 
people with additional participatory avenues to guard against governmental 
overreach while also helping “to create an educated and virtuous 
electorate.”202 And, at least on Amar’s telling, the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments, like the Constitution’s Preamble, “are at their core about 
popular sovereignty.”203 
Later amendments have been vital as well. The Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection has long been understood to 
“confer[] a substantive right to participate in elections on an equal basis 
with other qualified voters.”204 And the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-
199 AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 124–29 (1998); see also 
id. at 133 (“I hope it has not escaped our notice that no phrase appears in more of the first ten 
amendments than ‘the people.’”). The joint congressional resolution proposing these amendments 
described them as “extending the ground of public confidence in the government” to “best ensure the 
beneficent ends of its institution.” J. Res. 1, 1st Cong. 1 Stat. 97, 97 (1789). 
200 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
201 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982); see also AMAR, supra note 
199, at 20–21 (“[T]he First Amendment reaffirms the structural role of free speech and a free press in a 
working democracy.”). Amar describes the First Amendment’s speech protections as following a “deep 
popular-sovereignty logic” by extending the speech protections previously afforded to legislative 
discourse (including the Speech and Debate Clause of Article I, § 6) “to the people” as a whole. Id. at 
25–26. 
202 AMAR, supra note 199, at xii; see also 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 
283 (Phillips Bradley ed., Vintage Books 1990) (“The jury system as it is understood in America 
appears to me to be as direct and as extreme a consequence of the sovereignty of the people as universal 
suffrage.”). 
203 AMAR, supra note 199, at 121. 
204 City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 77 (1980) (plurality opinion); see also Harris v. McRae, 
448 U.S. 297, 322 n.25 (1980) (“[I]f a State adopts an electoral system, the Equal Protection Clause of 
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Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments all serve to broaden electoral 
participation by prohibiting “the United States or . . . any State” from 
denying or abridging the right to vote “on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude,”205 “on account of sex,”206 “by reason of 
failure to pay any poll tax or other tax,”207 and “on account of age” (for 
citizens “who are eighteen years of age or older”).208 
Given all this, it is not a stretch to regard electoral participation as one 
of the Constitution’s structural pillars, alongside federalism and the 
separation of powers. All three are mechanisms for constraining 
governmental authority. Taken together, they establish a system in which 
states can check the national government (and vice versa), the branches of 
the national government can check one another, and the people can check 
government officials at all levels.209 All three structural pillars, moreover, 
serve to connect the people with government. This is most obvious with 
respect to electoral participation, but it is true of federalism and the 
separation of powers as well. Dividing governmental authority vertically 
and horizontally gives the people multiple points of entry into the system 
and thus multiple paths for trying to convert their preferences into policy.210 
In this sense, federalism and the separation of powers might themselves be 
said to reflect the centrality of participation to our constitutional system.211 
the Fourteenth Amendment confers upon a qualified voter a substantive right to participate in the 
electoral process equally with other qualified voters.”). 
205 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
206 Id. amend. XIX. 
207 Id. amend. XXIV, § 1. By its terms this provision applies only in federal elections, but the 
Supreme Court has also construed the Fourteenth Amendment to provide a similar protection in state 
and local elections. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966). 
208 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1. 
209 Cf. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (observing that, 
at least when judicial recourse is unavailable, “the only way” for people to protect their rights is “by 
their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule”). 
210 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011) (“The federal structure . . . enables 
greater citizen ‘involvement in democratic processes,’ and makes government ‘more responsive by 
putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.’ Federalism . . . allows States to respond . . . to 
the initiative of those who seek a voice in shaping the destiny of their own times without having to rely 
solely upon the political processes that control a remote central power.” (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 
501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991))). 
211 Cf. Levinson, supra note 170, at 1293 (“[S]eparating structure from rights misses the point that 
the original design of the Constitution relied primarily on structural arrangements to protect rights. 
Convinced that direct protection of constitutionally enumerated rights would be futile, the Federalist 
Framers, led by James Madison, attempted to secure rights indirectly, by creating a structure of 
government that would empower vulnerable groups to protect their interests through the political 
process.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Overton, supra note 20, at 1275 (“The structural checks 
and balances of the document also rely on participation for their efficacy. By forcing the branches to 
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B. Scope of the Right
While the evidence seems quite strong that the Constitution confers 
some right to participate, one might question whether the right should be 
understood to have the sort of scope McCutcheon suggested—namely, a 
right to participate “in electing our political leaders” through voting, 
spending, and other avenues.212 On one hand, perhaps McCutcheon’s 
election-oriented framing of the right is too narrow. Elections are a vital 
part of democratic self-governance, but so are nonelectoral modes of 
participation, such as lobbying, protesting, attending public meetings, and 
simply speaking out on issues of public concern. Should the right 
encompass these activities as well? On the other hand, perhaps 
McCutcheon’s framing is too broad. If the allocation of political power 
ultimately depends on the casting and counting of ballots, perhaps the right 
should apply only to electoral mechanics and not to activities like spending 
that occur in the run-up to elections. This Section briefly considers each of 
these suggestions. Though the arguments in favor of broadening or 
narrowing the right are by no means frivolous, there are good reasons for 
McCutcheon to have described the right as it did. 
First, electoral participation and participation in civil society and 
governance outside the electoral context are interconnected but 
conceptually distinct. Both are essential to democracy and should be 
vigorously protected; nothing in this Article is meant to suggest otherwise. 
Robert Post has been especially eloquent in describing the importance of 
such nonelectoral participation.213 In particular, he identifies “participation 
in the ongoing formation of public opinion”—what he calls “discursive 
democracy”—“as a foundation for democratic self-government.”214 He 
posits that discursive democracy and elections are mutually reinforcing: An 
active public discourse allows elections to serve their democratic 
function.215 It is difficult, after all, for government to be responsive unless 
individuals and associations are able to develop and share their views on an 
ongoing basis between elections. Meanwhile, “[e]lections underwrite 
agree, the Constitution slows the governing process, allowing participation—through public debate, 
voting, or litigation—to take its effect in resolving disputes.”). 
212 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1440–41 (2014) (plurality opinion). 
213 See POST, supra note 24. 
214 Id. at 37; see also id. at 5 (“[T]he value of self-determination is realized when the people 
actively participate in the formation of public opinion.”). 
215 See Robert Post, Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 
1517, 1523–28 (1997); see also id. at 1528 (“I do not mean to deny, of course, that voting is an 
important means of participation in a democratic polity. I only claim that voting is not by itself 
sufficient to realize the value of democratic self-governance.”). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
700 
discursive democracy” by giving people faith that their views will be taken 
seriously by those in power.216 
But Post himself appreciates that elections play a special role in 
mediating “the relationship between the people and their representatives” 
and thus require their own dedicated set of legal principles.217 “The purpose 
of elections,” Post writes, “is to transform public opinion into legitimate 
public will.”218 Other scholars have made similar points. One, for instance, 
describes elections as “the paradigmatic method of turning opinion 
communicatively developed within the public sphere into political 
power.”219 To serve this channeling function appropriately—in other words, 
to facilitate the selection of representatives who are and will remain 
attentive to public opinion—elections are necessarily structured affairs.220 
The virtue of an election-oriented right to participate is that it is able to take 
account of the unique features of the electoral setting. In contrast, issues 
involving non-electoral participation tend to be ones that fall within the 
heartland of conventional First Amendment analysis.  
Second, limiting the right to participate to voting conceives of 
elections too narrowly. Elections no doubt culminate in the casting and 
counting of votes, and those activities are absolutely central to a properly 
functioning electoral process. But if, as just described, elections are an 
instrument for connecting the people to those who govern in their name, 
then the process necessarily involves more than just the mechanics of 
voting. Whether elections ultimately produce accountable and legitimate 
government depends not only on voting rules but also on factors such as 
how campaigns are conducted and financed. As noted earlier,221 voting and 
spending are both directed at influencing electoral outcomes, which is 
presumably why the Court has long accepted that the Constitution’s 
Elections Clause covers both activities. In Bluman v. FEC, a decision 
summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court, the three-judge district court 
noted that “[p]olitical contributions and express-advocacy expenditures are 
216 POST, supra note 24, at 59; see also id. at 60 (“Elections are essential to discursive democracy 
because they inspire public trust that representatives will be responsive to public opinion.”). 
217 Id. at 6, 81. 
218 Id. at 81. 
219 C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 43 
(1998). 
220 See, e.g., Pildes, supra note 22, at 51 (describing elections as “pervasively regulated (far more 
so than the general realm of public debate)”); Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral 
Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1816 (1999) (referring to elections as 
“highly structured spheres [with] regulations that would be impermissible in the general domain of 
public discourse”). 
221 See supra Section II.B. 
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an integral aspect of the process by which Americans elect officials to 
federal, state, and local government.”222 It thus makes sense for the right to 
participate in elections to encompass them as well. 
The rationales for narrowly defining the electoral process to exclude 
election-related spending are not compelling. Proponents of such an 
approach express concern about the government becoming “directly 
involved in the dialogue that determines if the current government or its 
party retains power.”223 But a similar concern equally applies when the 
government is involved in setting voting rules, an activity that all would 
agree is part of the electoral process.224 Furthermore, this is an argument 
against regulation, not one against conceptualizing spending as part of a 
right to participate. Proponents of a narrow definition also suggest that a 
broader definition creates line-drawing problems at the intersection of 
election-related spending and the general public discourse.225 The challenge 
of demarcating the electoral sphere is real, and it has long plagued efforts at 
regulating campaign finance.226 But line drawing is inevitable. A narrow 
definition of the electoral process would almost certainly raise difficulties 
of its own—for instance, where would regulations on election day 
campaigning near polling places fall? Ultimately, if democratic and 
constitutional theory counsel in favor of a right to participate that 
encompasses election-related spending, then we should be reluctant to 
define the right otherwise.  
C. Operationalizing the Right
This Section offers initial thoughts on how the Supreme Court might 
use the right to participate to reconcile the incongruities in the 
jurisprudence of voting and spending identified in Part I. As a practical 
matter, the easiest path forward would be to build on McCutcheon’s 
foundation, invoking the right to participate in order to inform and 
supplement existing approaches. Lower courts acting within the confines of 
the Court’s precedents could also use the right to participate in this way. If 
the right proved useful in harmonizing the law, then existing doctrinal 
boundaries should gradually give way. Alternatively, if the Court grows 
222 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288–89 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012). 
223 Bradley A. Smith, Separation of Campaign and State, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2038, 2056–57 
(2013). 
224 See discussion supra Section II.B. 
225 See Smith, supra note 223, at 2075. 
226 See POST, supra note 24, at 92 (“The ‘crucial issue’ is to establish a ‘boundary between [an] 
institutionalized electoral realm and general civil or public life.’” (quoting Baker, supra note 219, at 
25)). 
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sufficiently frustrated with the level of disharmony in voting and spending 
law, it could more assertively cast off accumulated doctrinal baggage and 
turn to the right to participate for a fresh start. Either way, the effort would 
draw upon similar animating principles. 
As a preliminary matter, the Court could adopt a shared vocabulary to 
describe the analysis that it undertakes in voting and spending cases. As 
noted above, the Court is already conducting a similar overarching inquiry 
in both contexts.227 One option might be to abandon the tiered scrutiny 
language that has long been used on the campaign finance side—language 
that already seems to be falling out of favor in the Court’s most recent 
cases.228 The balancing approach used in Crawford and the ballot access 
cases that preceded it is probably the more straightforward formulation.229 
And the Court could further develop that approach by referencing some 
Rehnquist-era campaign finance rulings that, for a time, seemed to be 
moving toward “a species of sliding scale scrutiny, under which ‘[t]he 
quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial 
scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and 
plausibility of the justification raised.’”230 In his widely cited concurrence 
in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, Justice Breyer was explicit 
about the need to “balance[] interests” in the campaign finance cases and 
elsewhere “in the field of election regulation.”231 Drawing upon such 
precedents might go some way toward addressing the concerns of those 
who reasonably criticize Crawford-type balancing as indeterminate, giving 
courts too much leeway to make decisions that reflect their own 
preconceptions.232  
The answer to the indeterminacy problem, however, is more likely to 
come not at the step of articulating the general framework, but at the 
227 See discussion supra Section I.A. 
228 Compare Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1665–66 (2015) (upholding a regulation 
of judicial campaign solicitations under a seemingly watered-down version of strict scrutiny), with 
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014) (plurality opinion) (invalidating a contribution cap 
under a seemingly heightened version of the intermediate scrutiny usually given to such laws). 
229 See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190 (2008) (plurality opinion); 
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789–90 (1983). 
230 Elmendorf, supra note 23, at 357–58 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 
391 (2000)). 
231 Nixon, 528 U.S. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
232 See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Voting Rules and Constitutional Law, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1836, 
1859 (2013) (“Anderson-Burdick balancing is such an imprecise instrument that it is easy for the 
balance to come out one way in the hands of one judge, yet come out in the exact opposite way in the 
hands of another. A test this indeterminate is arguably no test at all, and thus the federal constitutional 
law that is supposed to supervise the operation of a state’s electoral process has little objectivity or 
predictability.”). 
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subsequent step of applying it. That is where judicial discretion can be 
channeled and constrained, and where the real work of reconciling voting 
and spending law needs to be done. Toward that end, the primary value of 
the right to participate should be in fostering more consistent treatment of 
burdens, interests, facts, fit, and regulatory motive in voting and spending 
cases.  
1. Regulatory Burdens.—In terms of burdens, a shift in the voting
context toward the more individual-oriented assessments made in campaign 
finance cases may be in order. After all, the right to participate—whether 
by voting or spending—is a right that is “individual and personal in 
nature.”233 Judge Diane Wood hammered home this point when Crawford 
was in the Seventh Circuit. Dissenting from the denial of rehearing en 
banc, she observed that “[e]ven if only a single citizen is deprived 
completely of her right to vote—perhaps by a law preventing anyone 
named Natalia Burzynski from voting without showing 10 pieces of photo 
identification—this is still a ‘severe’ injury for that particular individual.”234 
When a regulation substantially interferes with any individual’s 
opportunity to participate through either voting or spending, judicial 
skepticism is warranted. Justice Scalia expressed concern that “an 
individual-focused approach” to voting cases would result in “detailed 
judicial supervision of the election process [which] would flout the 
Constitution’s express commitment of [electoral oversight] to the States.”235 
But the purpose of state oversight is to facilitate participation, not stymie it, 
and it is entirely appropriate for courts to ensure that a state is doing the 
former and not the latter.236 
Endeavoring to calibrate burdens across contexts would be useful as 
well. For instance, should a corporation’s option of using a PAC to make 
election-related expenditures be discounted as a mitigating factor when 
assessing BCRA’s burdens, while a convoluted provisional vote 
233 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964) (referring to the right to vote); see also Fishkin, 
supra note 24, at 1293 (“Each individual voter . . . has an independent interest in her status as a full, 
equal citizen.”); Flanders, supra note 173, at 145 (“[A]nalyzing voter fraud cases simply as matters of 
individual rights (specifically, the individual right to cast a ballot) should be the preferred way for 
courts to approach voter fraud.”). 
234 484 F.3d 436, 438 (7th Cir. 2007) (Wood, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). A 
Seventh Circuit panel recently took a similar position in a renewed challenge to Wisconsin’s voter ID 
law, declaring that, because “[t]he right to vote is personal,” “if even a single person eligible to vote is 
unable to get acceptable photo ID with reasonable effort,” he or she may be entitled to relief. Frank v. 
Walker, 819 F.3d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 2016).  
235 Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 208 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
236 See supra Section III.A. 
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mechanism is lauded for mitigating the burdens of Indiana’s voter ID law? 
Perhaps an argument could be made that the inevitability of some 
regulation of voting means that the acceptable baseline burden is higher in 
that context, but the foundational nature of the franchise counsels in favor 
of keeping the baseline modest. In any event, simply by being cognizant of 
such voting–spending comparisons, the Court may be able to avoid the 
most egregious inconsistencies.  
2. Governmental Interests.—When it comes to governmental
interests, it may be appropriate to give consideration in campaign finance 
cases to some of the regulatory rationales that have been accepted in recent 
voting cases. By focusing exclusively on a narrow interest in preventing 
quid pro quo corruption, the Court’s recent campaign finance decisions 
have shown insufficient regard for the underlying values at stake in 
elections. Because elections exist to foster democratic legitimacy and 
accountability,237 society has a fundamental interest in ensuring that the 
process is set up to advance those objectives.238 Preventing quid pro quo 
corruption is certainly important in this regard, but it is only one piece of 
the puzzle—something the Court already seems to appreciate in its voting 
and ballot cases. Those cases recognize the government’s “broad interests 
in protecting election integrity” and connect it to the closely related interest 
in “protecting public confidence in the integrity and legitimacy of 
representative government.”239 Along similar lines, members of the Court 
have occasionally noted the government’s interest in promoting broad 
electoral participation. In Justice Kennedy’s words, “[e]ncouraging citizens 
to vote is a legitimate, indeed essential, state objective; for the 
constitutional order must be preserved by a strong, participatory democratic 
process.”240 Participation, in other words, may sometimes appear on both 
sides of the judicial ledger, with plaintiffs asserting that a law has burdened 
237 See supra Section III.A. 
238 Interestingly, though it reaffirmed that quid pro quo corruption is the only potential interest the 
government may offer to justify a contribution limit, the McCutcheon plurality acknowledged that 
“responsiveness [of representatives to constituents] is key to the very concept of self-governance 
through elected officials.” McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014) (plurality opinion). 
239 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 197, 200 (plurality opinion) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (per curiam) (“Confidence in the integrity 
of our electoral processes is essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy.”). 
240 Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 587 (2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also 
Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 228 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing “citizen participation in 
[our electoral] processes” as “essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy” (quoting 
Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4)); Overton, supra note 20, at 1275 (identifying instances in which Supreme Court 
Justices have nodded to a “participation principle”). 
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their right to participate and the government seeking to defend the law as a 
justifiable participation-facilitating measure. 
It is difficult to fathom why interests in electoral integrity and 
democratic participation that are rightly accepted as vital in the voting 
context are dismissed out of hand in the spending context. It was not 
always this way. Describing the Tillman Act, a foundational piece of 
campaign finance legislation, Justice Frankfurter wrote that “its aim was 
not merely to prevent the subversion of the integrity of electoral 
process.”241 Instead, “[i]ts underlying philosophy was to sustain the active, 
alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise 
conduct of government.”242 The explanation implicitly offered in Citizens 
United for its narrow corruption-centered approach seems to be that 
restrictions on electoral spending are simply incapable of ever enhancing 
electoral integrity.243 But that is an empirical question, which makes such a 
categorical rule misplaced. If a legislature generates an impressive record 
indicating that a particular spending practice “cause[s] the electorate to lose 
faith in our democracy,”244 a court should at least be willing to consider it. 
Numerous scholars have criticized the narrowness of the Court’s 
corruption-centered campaign finance analysis and offered alternatives, but 
thus far to no avail.245 The virtue of the right-to-participate framework is 
that it offers a principled way for the Court to draw upon an alternative 
approach to governmental interests that it already approves when reviewing 
voting regulations.  
3. Factual Determinations and Regulatory Fit.—As for assessing
evidentiary requirements and regulatory fit, something of a middle ground 
241 United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 575 (1957). 
242 Id.; see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 144 (2003) (“Take away Congress’ authority to 
regulate the appearance of undue influence and ‘the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune 
could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance.’” (quoting Nixon v. 
Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000))). Dissenters in recent campaign finance decisions 
have made similar points in support of the regulations being challenged. See, e.g., Citizens United v. 
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 472 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); FEC v. Wis. 
Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 507 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
243 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357. 
244 Id. at 360. 
245 Post, for instance, endorses a version of the “electoral integrity” interest, which he says 
“consists of public confidence that elected officials attend to public opinion.” POST, supra note 24, at 
87. Justice Breyer has also sought to push campaign finance law in this direction. He has said that the
goal should be “to democratize the influence that money can bring to bear upon the electoral process,
thereby building public confidence in that process, broadening the base of a candidate’s meaningful
financial support, and encouraging greater public participation.” Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic
Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 253 (2002); see also Nixon, 528 U.S. at 401 (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (similar).
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between the current voting and spending approaches is probably warranted. 
When a regulation is alleged to encumber an individual’s ability to 
participate—whether by voting or spending—it seems reasonable for courts 
to insist upon some formal showing of the existence and the extent of the 
burden. And when the government seeks to justify such a regulation, courts 
should exercise independent judgment about whether it serves its purported 
ends in a properly tailored way. As McCutcheon rightly observed, “[e]ven 
when the Court is not applying strict scrutiny,” “fit matters”246—and it 
should matter just as much with respect to voting regulations as spending 
regulations. If the government can reasonably achieve its objectives with 
fewer participatory burdens, courts should look skeptically upon its use of a 
more burdensome alternative.247 
4. Legislative Motives.—In both spending and voting cases, courts
should be mindful of legislators’ expertise.248 They should perhaps be 
especially mindful of that expertise in the spending context. After all, 
virtually every legislator will be intimately familiar with realities of 
campaign financing. In contrast, legislators may very well have more 
limited experience with the mechanics of voting, since that work tends to 
be delegated to state and local administrators.249 
At the same time, courts should remain alert to the possibility that 
those in power will seek to entrench themselves and their allies by reducing 
the participatory opportunities of their adversaries. In this regard, the right 
to participate gives the Court an opening to reconcile its oddly divergent 
sensibilities about legislative motives in voting and spending cases.250 In 
both contexts, those in power have the incentive and the opportunity to 
seek partisan and incumbent entrenchment. I am aware of no empirical 
evidence suggesting that this danger is greater for spending regulations 
than for voting regulations. If anything, the incentive to manipulate voting 
rules might be stronger since votes have a more direct impact on electoral 
246 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1456 (2014) (plurality opinion). 
247 See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) (declaring that, “if there are other, reasonable 
ways to achieve [the government’s] goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity,” 
courts must reject “the way of greater interference”); see also Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 542 
(1965) (explaining that it does not suffice for the government to point to “some remote administrative 
benefit”). 
248 See, e.g., Nixon, 528 U.S. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring) (advocating deference to “empirical 
legislative judgments” given the legislature’s “significantly greater institutional expertise”). 
249 See Justin Weinstein-Tull, Election Law Federalism, 114 MICH. L. REV. 747, 752 (2016) (“The 
Constitution initiates decentralization by placing the primary responsibility for holding elections with 
states. States have further decentralized election administration by delegating most election 
administration responsibilities to local governments.” (footnote omitted)). 
250 See supra Section I.E. 
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outcomes than dollars. In any event, one practical option is for courts to 
ratchet up their scrutiny as suspicions of improper motives mount.251  
IV. A BROADER VIEW
Beyond its potential usefulness in resolving tensions in the existing 
law of voting and spending, the right to participate in the electoral process 
also suggests new avenues of inquiry in election law jurisprudence and 
scholarship. This Part identifies three ways in which a more 
comprehensive, participation-centered approach to voting and spending 
might advance election law discourse. 
A. Who Participates?
Reorienting voting and spending law around the right to participate in 
the electoral process will inevitably raise questions about whom the right 
protects, and when. Existing law makes somewhat different populations of 
individuals (and entities) eligible to engage in particular participatory 
activities. Minors, permanent resident aliens, felons, and corporations are 
allowed to spend money on elections but cannot vote in elections.252 On the 
flipside, at least some eligible voters—including federal civil servants, 
federal judges and their employees, and individual federal government 
contractors—are barred from contributing to campaigns.253 Moreover, those 
who wish to spend are generally free to do so in multiple jurisdictions, 
while those who wish to vote may do so only in the one jurisdiction where 
they are deemed to reside. This was an issue in McCutcheon itself; Shaun 
McCutcheon wanted to contribute money in a host of races around the 
251 Cf. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 249 (2006) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that courts 
should look for “danger signs” that justify closer scrutiny of campaign contribution limits); Ringhand, 
supra note 129, at 307 (suggesting that, if a voting restriction seems likely “to benefit one party at the 
expens[e] of the other,” courts should treat that as a “red flag”); Bertrall L. Ross II, The State as 
Witness: Windsor, Shelby County, and Judicial Distrust of the Legislative Record, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
2027, 2077 (2014) (suggesting that close review of a legislative record may be warranted if the 
democratic process that produced the record malfunctioned). 
252 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 231–32 (2003) (addressing minors); Note, The Meaning(s) 
of “the People” in the Constitution, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1078, 1087 (2013) (noting that “minors, felons, 
and noncitizens like foreign students . . . cannot vote”). 
253 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 423 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (discussing restrictions on civil servants); Wagner v. FEC, 793 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 
2015) (en banc) (upholding a federal law banning contributions by government contractors); CODE OF 
CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 5(A)(3) (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/vol02a-
ch02_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZQ7Y-UKB8 ] (“A judge should not . . . make a contribution to a political 
organization or candidate.”); CODE OF CONDUCT FOR JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES Canon 5(A) (2013), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/vol02a-ch03_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VB9-J2VY] (“A 
judicial employee . . . should not . . . contribute to a partisan political organization, candidate, or 
event.”). 
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country.254 Other participatory activities come with their own eligibility 
rules. Eligibility to vote or spend does not always translate into eligibility 
to run for office, sign or circulate a ballot petition, and more.255 Have we 
drawn the right lines? How do we evaluate our choices? 
The upshot of placing voting, spending, and other electoral activities 
within a broader participatory framework is not necessarily that the same 
eligibility rules must apply across the board. Instead, the value of the right 
to participate is to encourage more comprehensive thinking about the 
extent to which differences in the nature of voting and spending might 
justify different eligibility criteria. Because voting has direct legal 
consequences that spending does not, perhaps it is sensible to limit the 
franchise to those who have reached the age of majority and formally 
aligned themselves with the political community through their citizenship 
status, while allowing a broader collection of interested parties to have 
input in the electoral process through spending.256 Then again, minors, 
permanent residents, and felons do have a substantial stake in their 
communities, which may counsel in favor of giving them a direct voice in 
community affairs. A few localities have in fact lowered the voting age in 
municipal elections,257 and historical examples of states and localities that 
extended the franchise to resident aliens abound.258 Meanwhile, despite its 
attraction as a participation-enhancing device, nonresident spending could 
potentially interfere with the connection between representatives and their 
core resident constituents. Partly because of this perceived danger, Justice 
254 Briffault, supra note 18, at 30 (“[T]he very essence of the McCutcheon decision is the 
facilitation of out-of-district and out-of-state donations.”); see also Sullivan, supra note 21, at 683 
(observing that “political money facilitates metaphysical carpetbagging”). 
255 See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 18, at 52–53. 
256 See, e.g., Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459, 483–84 (D. Vt. 2000), aff’d in part, vacated in 
part, 382 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2004), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) 
(striking down limit on out-of-state contributions and noting that out-of-state residents had a right to 
participate in the state’s political process); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. 1077, 1135–42 (2014) (offering a qualified endorsement of cross-state political spending). 
257 For example, Takoma Park, Maryland, and Hyattsville, Maryland have lowered the voting age 
to sixteen in municipal elections. See Arelis R. Hernández, Hyattsville Becomes Second U.S. 




258 See, e.g., Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and 
Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1393 (1993). 
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Stevens has suggested that individuals should be allowed to participate by 
spending only in the jurisdictions where they can vote.259 
While the right to participate is unlikely to provide easy answers, it 
may highlight the competing values at stake and suggest potential 
accommodations. For instance, the fact that individuals can have interests 
outside the jurisdiction in which they can vote may counsel in favor of at 
least some nonresident spending, though perhaps certain constraints might 
be warranted to avoid diluting the participatory rights of residents. Perhaps 
more quixotically, the practice of spending by nonresidents arguably 
bolsters the case for creating electoral mechanisms that enable individuals 
to cast votes outside their home jurisdictions, as a few scholars have 
proposed.260 
At the very least, the right to participate calls into question the Court’s 
declaration in Citizens United that the First Amendment does not permit the 
government to make identity-based distinctions among those who wish to 
make election-related expenditures, including corporations.261 Despite that 
broad pronouncement, campaign finance law continues to tolerate some 
such distinctions. Although corporations can now make independent 
expenditures, they continue to be banned from making direct contributions 
to political candidates.262 And within two years of its Citizens United 
decision, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed a lower court decision 
upholding the federal ban on political contributions by foreign nationals 
who are not permanent U.S. residents.263 Rejecting an argument that 
Citizens United had called the ban into doubt, the lower court declared it 
“fundamental to the definition of our national political community that 
foreign citizens do not have a constitutional right to participate in, and thus 
259 See Justice John Paul Stevens, Address at the Administrative Law Section of the D.C. Bar: 
Oops!, 2014 Harold Leventhal Lecture (Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.supremecourt.gov/
publicinfo/speeches/JPS%20Speech(DC)_09-12-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JQT-5467]. 
260 See, e.g., Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal 
Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1909 (1994); Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 253, 329–30 (1993). But see Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in
Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1159 (1996) (contending that “cross-border voting would
undermine the local conditions conducive to political participation” by reducing opportunities for
“deliberation, discussion, and debate at the neighborhood level”). 
261 See 558 U.S. 310, 342–43 (2010). 
262 See United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2012) (upholding the federal corporate 
contribution ban). 
263 Bluman v. FEC, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012), aff’g 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011); see also 
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 423 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the 
Court has “never cast doubt on laws that place special restrictions on campaign spending by foreign 
nationals”). Justice Stevens’s Citizens United opinion noted that the Court had also “consistently 
approved laws that bar Government employees, but not others, from contributing to or participating in 
political activities.” Id. 
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may be excluded from, activities of democratic self-government.”264 As this 
reasoning suggests, framing the analysis in terms of the right to participate 
in the electoral process (rather than in terms of a general First Amendment 
right to speak) highlights the inevitable need to define the community’s 
membership.265 This definitional task is not one for courts alone; it requires 
considered judgments from legislators and the public. 
B. The Big Participatory Picture
Because the right to participate embraces multiple election-related 
activities, it also may prompt greater attention to the overall circumstances 
of participants. Perhaps a voting regulation becomes especially suspect if it 
turns out to place the greatest burdens on individuals who are otherwise at 
risk of being marginalized in the political process. For those who lack the 
financial resources to contribute to their preferred candidates, or lack the 
connections to seek out candidates directly, or lack the capability to 
provide meaningful volunteer assistance to a campaign, an onerous voting 
rule may sever the one tenuous link they have to our system of self-
government.266  
This sort of holistic analysis could also make the burdens imposed by 
certain spending regulations appear less severe. People in Shaun 
McCutcheon’s shoes have ample means to participate vigorously in 
elections even if their aggregate annual campaign contributions are capped. 
Indeed, empirical evidence indicates that affluent individuals have far more 
contact with public officials than do their low-income counterparts.267 
McCutcheon offered an implicit response to this point by suggesting that 
the burden imposed by the aggregate contribution cap was “especially 
great” because contributors like McCutcheon had no other “realistic” way 
264 Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 288. 
265 Cf. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 165–66 (1874) (“There cannot be a nation without a 
people. The very idea of a political community, such as a nation is, implies an association of persons for 
the promotion of their general welfare. Each one of the persons associated becomes a member of the 
nation formed by the association.”); Bulman-Pozen, supra note 256, at 1138 (“After Bluman, it is no 
longer sufficient to define [contributions and expenditures] as speech; it is also necessary to define who 
is speaking and how the speaker relates to the political community.”). 
266 See, e.g., Fishkin, supra note 24, at 1353 (“Because the right to vote is a central mechanism of 
democratic inclusion, it is particularly important to protect the right to vote of citizens who are already 
marginalized—treated as less than full and equal citizens—in other domains of political and social life. 
Such citizens may be less likely to be able to pursue other avenues of participation in politics or the 
public sphere. . . . When other paths by which we might contribute to political and public life are closed 
off, the bare civic minimum—the vote—takes on a greater importance. The significance of the vote as a 
mark of civic inclusion is greatest for those whose inclusion might otherwise be in doubt.”). 
267 LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED
AGE 276–77, 282 (2008). 
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to support the many candidates he favored.268 It would not be possible, for 
instance, to volunteer his time to them all. In reality, this line of argument 
just seems to confirm McCutcheon’s privileged position. The cap still left 
him free to do more than most people ever could.269 Notably, while the 
Court’s analysis was incomplete, the very fact that it considered other 
available options suggests that the Court accepts the propriety of taking the 
big participatory picture into account. 
To be clear, there are limits to this sort of holistic analysis. Voting and 
spending are not perfect substitutes, and the exercise of one participatory 
right generally should not preclude the exercise of others. But a 
participation-oriented approach does offer courts and legislators a 
mechanism for thinking more comprehensively about how laws affect 
opportunities for inclusion in democratic governance. 
Along similar lines, the right to participate may encourage analysis of 
the interplay between voting and spending regulations. As election-related 
spending becomes increasingly unregulated, perhaps it becomes all the 
more important to protect voting rights and facilitate the exercise of the 
franchise in order to ensure that “the great body of the people”270 is still 
ultimately calling the tune. And perhaps there is a need for 
countermeasures in those areas where money is most likely to exert 
influence that the exercise of the franchise alone cannot check. For 
instance, money plays a crucial role in establishing the field of viable 
candidates long before votes are ever cast.271 Or, approached from another 
angle, perhaps voting restrictions could be seen as burdening not just 
voters, but spenders as well. As the Court explained in Citizens United, 
someone’s willingness “to spend money to try to persuade voters 
presupposes that the people have the ultimate influence over elected 
officials.”272 But if voting becomes more costly, then more money may 
need to be spent to organize voter drives and to convince potential voters 
that casting a ballot is worth the hassle. 
268 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1449 (2014) (plurality opinion). 
269 In earlier cases, the Court did not treat contribution limits as unduly burdensome merely 
because they prevented a contributor from doing more. Instead, the Court asked “whether the 
contribution limitation was so radical in effect as to render political association ineffective.” Nixon v. 
Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 337, 397 (2000). 
270 THE FEDERALIST No. 57, supra note 174, at 278 (James Madison). 
271 See Spencer Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation, 
153 U. PA. L. REV. 73, 91 (2004) (discussing “the importance of meaningful participation in 
determining the viability of candidates”). 
272 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010). 
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C. Thinking About Electoral Structure
Finally, fleshing out the right to participate may go some way toward 
bridging a longstanding divide in election law scholarship between those 
who emphasize individual rights and those who focus on structural values. 
At risk of oversimplifying a rich and nuanced literature, those in the 
individual-rights camp take the position that the judiciary’s proper role in 
election law cases, as in other contexts, is to safeguard the rights of 
individuals, not to engage in a freewheeling effort to improve the workings 
of the democratic system.273 Structuralists, in contrast, contend that an 
individual-rights orientation obscures the fact that election law rulings 
inevitably shape the character of our democracy.274 It is better, in their 
view, to resolve disputes by thinking directly about which outcomes will 
make the system function better overall.275 To this end, some leading 
structuralists stress the goal of maintaining “an appropriately competitive 
political order,”276 while others emphasize the importance of assuring broad 
public engagement,277 or of “aligning the preferences of voters with those 
of their elected representatives.”278 
273 See, e.g., RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY 
FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 7 (2003) (eschewing “process theory” in favor of a “substantive 
theory of political equality”); Guy-Uriel Charles, Judging the Law of Politics, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1099, 
1127 (2005) (“The traditional objection to structuralism, from the time of Frankfurter to today, is that 
courts cannot do political philosophy.”); Nathaniel Persily, The Search for Comprehensive Descriptions 
and Prescriptions in Election Law, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1509, 1515–17 (2003). Professor Hasen has 
called structural arguments “misguided and potentially dangerous. They evince judicial hubris, a belief 
that judges appropriately should be cast in the role of supreme political regulators.” Richard L. Hasen, 
The Supreme Court and Election Law: A Reply to Three Commentators, 31 J. LEGIS. 1, 4 (2004). 
274 See, e.g., Pildes, supra note 22, at 54–55. 
275 See, e.g., id. at 39–41; Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan 
Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 645 (1998). Finding this back-and-forth 
unproductive, at least one prominent commentator has tried to bridge the gap by calling upon both sides 
to recognize the “dualistic nature of election law claims.” Charles, supra note 273, at 1113. 
276 Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 275, at 716. 
277 See, e.g., Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 673–74 (2007). In a 
recent synopsis of this literature, Stephanopoulos also places Justice Stephen Breyer and Christopher 
Elmendorf in this camp. Stephanopoulos, supra note 26, at 297 (first citing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE 
LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 5 (2005); and then citing Christopher S. 
Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation: New Pressures for a Structural Theory of the Right 
to Vote?, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643, 653 (2008)). 
278 Stephanopoulos, supra note 26, at 291. Scholars sometimes spar over which of these values 
deserves primacy, but the values are more complementary than antagonistic: An electoral system with 
healthy levels of competition will tend to encourage broad participation, and broad participation is more 
likely to produce the election winners whose preferences track those of the public as a whole. Cf. 
Isaacharoff & Pildes, supra note 275, at 646 (“Only through an appropriately competitive partisan 
environment can one of the central goals of democratic politics be realized: that the policy outcomes of 
the political process be responsive to the interests and views of citizens.”). 
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For the most part, the Supreme Court has not heeded calls to “unify 
constitutional oversight” of election-related controversies by focusing on 
one or more of these structural values.279 The Court continues to use the 
vocabulary of individual rights, and issues like voting and spending remain 
as “cubbyholed” as ever.280 Part of the reason may be that structuralists 
offer no clear path from here to there. Courts are presumably 
uncomfortable with the idea of replacing familiar rights-oriented analysis 
with something more akin to political theorizing, and appropriately so.281 
The right to participate may offer the judiciary a way to take greater 
account of structural values in at least a subset of election law cases 
without abandoning the individual-rights paradigm that is the judiciary’s 
traditional bread and butter.282 The right to participate is plainly an 
individual right, but, at the same time, it is context-specific, applying only 
in the electoral domain. It directs attention toward that domain’s distinctive 
institutional features in ways that reliance on broader First Amendment or 
equal protection principles may not. The right to participate is thus a 
structured individual right, not a “general, intrinsic libert[y].”283 It gives 
individuals the opportunity to be part of something—namely, the electoral 
process.284 Accordingly, judgments about the proper structure of that 
process determine the right’s scope and application.285 
For this reason, framing legal analysis in terms of the right to 
participate encourages us to reflect upon how the electoral process 
279 Pildes, supra note 22, at 39–40. 
280 Id. at 39. 
281 See id. at 40 (“Constitutional lawyers are trained to think in terms of rights and equality and to 
elaborate the conceptual structure, legal and moral, of these core constitutional commitments.”); see 
also Fishkin, supra note 24, at 1329 (“[C]ourts are accustomed to . . . deciding, on the basis of the facts 
of an individual plaintiff’s case, whether the burdens the state has placed on individual rights are 
justified by the state’s interests, or whether some other route to casting a ballot needs to be widened or 
created. Courts are less comfortable deciding on massive structural reforms that alter the way everyone 
votes in the hope of striking a better balance between vital but competing structural interests.”). 
282 Cf. Gerken, supra note 107, at 521 (“[I]t is hard to identify sensible limiting principles without 
the aid of an individual-rights-based framework, which brings with it a set of well-developed strategies 
for cabining judicial action.”). 
283 Pildes, supra note 22, at 52; see also Schauer & Pildes, supra note 220, at 1814–16 (describing 
the “structural conception of rights”); Waldron, supra note 151, at 308 (“[O]ne cannot understand 
political rights in terms of the drawing of boundaries around autonomous individuals . . . .”). 
284 See Waldron, supra note 151, at 311 (“To participate is to ‘take a part or share in an action . . .’ 
something which necessarily supposes that one is not the only person with a part or share in the activity 
in question.” (footnote omitted)). 
285 See Schauer & Pildes, supra note 220, at 1807 n.15 (“To the extent that many constitutional 
rights are best understood as tools for realizing various common or collective or public goods, rather 
than in more individualistic terms, the content of rights depends on how the relevant public good ought 
best be understood.”). 
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functions and should function. Courts will need to develop baseline 
conceptions of how easy or difficult it should be for individuals to engage 
in various forms of electoral participation. And they will need to do so not 
in a vacuum, but against a backdrop of evolving popular discourse and 
legislative action. As perspectives and electoral practices change, baselines 
may need to shift as well. It is an iterative process, with judicial decisions 
shaping participation, and participation shaping judicial decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
As Pam Karlan once observed: “It may be impossible to think 
intelligently about any of the critical problems that beset the American 
electoral system without ultimately having to think about all of 
them . . . .”286 This Article has tried to put together two of the important 
pieces of the electoral puzzle. In so doing, it has exposed some glaring 
incongruities in the law of voting and spending. Though voting and 
spending differ in important ways, this Article concludes that it is 
nevertheless valuable to conceptualize them as aspects of a broader 
constitutionally grounded right to participate in the electoral process. The 
right to participate holds the potential to make voting and spending 
jurisprudence more coherent and principled, and perhaps it can help to 
reshape other aspects of election law as well.  
286 Pamela S. Karlan, Politics by Other Means, 85 VA. L. REV. 1697, 1706 (1999). 
